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7Preface
Corruption remains a serious problem in many modern economies. The se-
vere consequences of corruption have been documented in numerous empiri-
cal studies (e.g. Mauro 1995, Tanzi 1998, Hwang 2002, Gupta et al. 2002).
Therefore, the design and implementation of effective anticorruption mea-
sures remains an important concern.
The problem is that, due to its illegal and secret nature, corruption is
hard to detect and observed indictments are likely only the tip of the iceberg.
Therefore, authorities should rely on anti-corruption measures that (ex-ante)
undermine incentives for bribery by, for example, reducing the expected gains
from corruption, and/or by undermining trust between potential illegal part-
ners. The former can typically be ensured by e.g. increased penalties and/or
probabilities of detection, if possible, or by increasing the opportunity cost
of corruption by offering high-enough wages. The latter can be facilitated by
leniency policies.
The first chapter of my dissertation addresses the interplay of monitor-
ing, detection, and wages and is motivated by recent discussions in the Czech
Republic about the introduction of new means of monitoring police officers
on duty. Leaving aside the question whether such monitoring systems can
be effective anti-corruption measures, I conjectured that they might nega-
tively affect officers’ work incentives - as suggested by Cremer (1995) in a
labor market setting without corruption. Therefore, I analyze the effect of
increased monitoring on both the agent’s incentives to be corrupt and to
exert a high level of effort.
I construct a two period principal-agent model. The agent’s type is his
predisposition to corruption and is unobserved before signing the contract. I
assume two types of agent: honest, who are never corrupt (their exogenously
given psychic cost of corruption is too high), and opportunistic, who can
be either corrupt or non-corrupt in a given period (their psychic cost of
8corruption is low enough). The output that the agent produces is altogether
affected by three factors: the agent’s chosen effort (low or high), exogenous
luck (good or bad) and the agent’s decision to be corrupt or not in the given
period. Only a high level of effort, good luck and non-corruptibility can
lead to high produced output. The principal offers a two-period contract in
which she commits to wages, monitoring technology and a firing policy. Both
monitoring and the possible firing of the agent happen after the first period.
If the principal does not monitor the agent, she only observes the produced
output. Alternatively she could detect the agent who misbehaved by using
one of the monitoring technologies: Monitoring of Effort, or Monitoring of
Corruption.
I use my model to illustrate that it might not always be in the principal’s
best interest to conduct monitoring. The intuition is in line with that in
Cremer (1995) - when the principal only observes output she can threaten
to fire the agent after producing low output. This threat is an important
part of the incentive package (the high quality type has an extra incentive
to put in more effort to improve his probability of producing high output).
Once the principal observes the reasons underlying low output, this threat
is no longer credible (the principal prefers to keep the high quality type to
firing him and hiring a new agent of unknown characteristics for the second
period) and thus, this part of the incentives disappears.
I find such a “Cremer-like” result in the case when the principal monitors
the effort choice of the agent. Monitoring of Effort improves the sorting of
types. Therefore, the principal cannot credibly threaten to fire the agent
after observing low output, which results in weaker incentives of the agent
to “behave.” Specifically, I find that the agent might have more incentive
to be corrupt when Monitoring of Effort is implemented. Monitoring of
Corruption, in contrast, does not improve the sorting of types. Therefore,
the principal’s firing rule after the first period is exactly the same as with
No Monitoring. Consequently, no “Cremer-like” result emerges. Quite on
the contrary, the expected penalty for corruption serves as an additional
enforcement mechanism and Monitoring of Corruption negatively affects the
agent’s incentives to be corrupt. As a result, the principal can pay a lower
expected wage with Monitoring of Corruption than with No Monitoring (or
with Monitoring of Effort).
Importantly, the results suggest that the effect of monitoring one dimen-
sion of the agent’s strategy profile may spill over to the other dimension.
Specifically, my conclusion differs from those in the motivating literature:
9the incentives to exert effort are not distorted by monitoring; it is indeed
the incentive to be corrupt that might be negatively affected if the principal
monitors the agent’s effort choice.
In the two chapters that follow I analyze (experimentally) leniency policies
as promising anti-corruption measures.
Leniency policies award fine reductions of varying intensities to wrong-
doers who spontaneously report an illegal agreement and thereby help to
convict their accomplice(s). They serve as both the enforcement mechanism
as much as a means of deterrence in that, if appropriately designed and im-
plemented, they have the potential to undermine trust between wrongdoers.
Leniency policies have been in use in a number of countries (e.g. Great
Britain, France, Germany, the USA, or Canada, also the Czech Republic and
Slovakia), mostly recognized as an anti-cartel mechanism. Also in the eco-
nomic literature, the promising anti-cartel properties of leniency programs
have been confirmed (see e.g. Spagnolo 2004, Apesteguia et al. 2004, Bigoni
et al. 2008a,b). Corruption also arises from an illegal relationship that relies
heavily on trust and therefore leniency policies have a potential to work well
in corruption scenarios.
Leniency policies to deter cartels are, however, not directly applicable
as anti-corruption measures: cartel deterrence is essentially a simultaneous
game while strategies, payoffs, and the move structure of anti-corruption
measures are asymmetric. To my knowledge the first theoretical work ana-
lyzing the various effects of leniency policies on corruption is Buccirossi and
Spagnolo (2006). The authors show that poorly designed moderate policies
may have a serious counter-productive effect: they might allow a briber to
punish at a relatively low cost a partner who does not respect an illegal
agreement. In other words, some leniency policies might actually provide an
enforcement mechanism for occasional illegal transactions. Thus, contrary to
the intention, they might increase corruption.
Buccirossi and Spagnolo’s result, together with the theoretical and exper-
imental evidence from the literature on cartel deterrence, suggests that the
potential of leniency policies to undermine trust between wrongdoers hinges
upon proper design and implementation (Spagnolo 2004, Apesteguia et al.
2004, Bigoni et al. 2008a,b).
In Chapters 2 and 3 I use a generalized Buccirossi and Spagnolo model
(see Richmanova´ and Ortmann 2008) for the experimental testing of leniency
policies as an anti-corruption measure. In Chapter 2, I use this model to
study the effects of parameter changes that do not affect the theoretical
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prediction. In Chapter 3, which has Andreas Ortmann as a co-author, we
use this model to study the effects of “loaded” and “neutral” instructions.
It has been documented in the literature that a change in parameter-
ization that does not affect the theoretical prediction might indeed have
consequences for the behavior of subjects in the lab (see e.g. Goeree and
Holt 2001). Due to their social context, anti-corruption experiments might
be particularly sensitive to changes in design. Moreover, in the generalized
Buccirossi and Spagnolo game, the action bringing the highest possible pay-
off is also associated with a risk of considerable loss, therefore, risk or loss
attitudes are also likely to play a role. Altogether, I expected that subjects
in the lab might not behave in accordance with the theoretical prediction, es-
pecially when the prediction is made under an assumption of risk neutrality.
It was therefore important to test the sensitivity of subjects to some para-
metric changes. The question I ask is whether by making corruption more
attractive by i) increasing the potential gain and ii) reducing the penalty
if bribery is discovered, I can induce more corruption in the lab even if the
theoretical prediction suggests no change (high-incentive treatment). I do in-
deed find a significant effect of parametric change. Even though the change
I implemented has no consequences for the theoretical prediction, I observe
much more corruption in the high-incentive treatment. Thus, my results
suggest that details do matter, and this should be taken into account in law
enforcement design.
Following the earlier work of Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006), we
study in the final chapter the effect of “loaded” instructions in the gener-
alized Bucccirossi and Spagnolo model. Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt find
no significant impact of instructions framing (although this result may be
the artifact of too few data points, as the difference seems visible from the
graphs). The authors conclude that this result may be caused by the nature
of the game: it is very simple, and as it was designed to capture all the basic
features of bribery, even with neutral wording, subjects may have deciphered
what the experiment was about. Our bribery game includes stages where
players can report their opponents and receive leniency, which makes it more
complex and also potentially more susceptible to the non-neutral context.
Therefore, it calls for a separate analysis. We find a strong gender effect
- male and female participants react differently to the non-neutral context.
The effect of context becomes significant once we allow for gender-specific
coefficients. Thus, in contrast to the results of Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt
(2006), we find that a bribery context indeed makes a (significant) difference.
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Moreover, our result on gender is interesting also from a policy perspective.
It adds to existing evidence (e.g. Swamy et al. 2001) that using women in
“dangerous” positions in organizations, like in auditing, might be one way to
fight corruption.
In both Chapters 2 and 3 we also study to what extent the subjects’ de-
cisions in the experiment can be explained by their basic socio-demographic
characteristics – the econometric analysis provides limited evidence on their
role. Our data suggest that trust and preferences towards others might also
play a role. Results in Chapter 2 suggest that calibration, i.e. parameteri-
zation that reflects “real-life” situations reasonably well, might be even more
important than in other scenarios. The results in Chapter 3 suggest that sub-
jects in a bribery game engage in all sorts of social considerations, including
moral scruples, which should not be dismissed by experimenters looking for
relevant policy implications. Both chapters provide a testbed for the experi-
mental testing of anti-corruption measures and add evidence to the on-going
discussion of the need for socio-demographic controls. Further experimental
testing of leniency policies might have to take these findings into account.
That said, let me stress that the experimental results provide tantalizing
evidence that there is something to the Bucccirossi and Spagnolo model. For
the first time, a number of real world subjects are shown to understand and
use a strategic and ill-designed legal environment to enforce occasional cor-
rupt transactions, as hypothesized by Buccirossi and Spagnolo. Our results
indeed provide a confirmation of Buccirossi and Spagnolo’s hypothesis.

Chapter 1
On the Hidden Costs of
Monitoring Corruption and
Effort
Abstract
In this chapter, I analyze the effects of monitoring on an agent’s incentives
in a two-period principal-agent model in which the agent decides on his ef-
fort and corruptibility. The agent’s type and strategy are unknown to the
principal. I compare incentive-compatible wages under three different sce-
narios: when the principal does not monitor and only observes output; when
she monitors the agent’s effort choice; and when she monitors the agent’s
corruptibility. I find that monitoring of effort improves the sorting of types
but it might also give the agent more incentive to be corrupt. Monitoring of
corruption does not improve the sorting of types but it negatively affects the
agent’s incentive to be corrupt.
Keywords: corruption, monitoring, contract, incentive-compatibility
JEL classification: D73,D86,K42
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1.1 Introduction
It has been shown in the career concerns literature that the principal’s mon-
itoring might harm the agent’s incentives (see e.g. Cremer 1995; Holmstro¨m
1999; Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole 1999; Prat 2005): if the agent’s ability
is unknown and his effort cannot be perfectly observed by the principal, the
agent might have an incentive to put in more effort in order to signal high
ability. Once the principal starts to observe the agent’s ability, this incentive
disappears.
Similarly, the literature on intrinsic motivation suggests that monitoring,
as a display of distrust, is likely to be detrimental to the agent’s intrinsic
motivation and his dedication to the job (e.g., Kreps 1997 and Benabou and
Tirole 2003).
Monitoring thus might not necessarily lead to improved performance of
the agent and in some situations the principal might be better off not moni-
toring.
The present research is motivated by a recent discussion in the Czech Re-
public. To fight corruption, law enforcement authorities discussed installing
cameras and GPS systems into police cars in order to monitor traffic police
officers on duty. Leaving aside the question whether such monitoring systems
can be effective, an important question is whether they might negatively af-
fect officers’ incentives. Some officers, especially those who are honest, may
be offended and reduce effort in retaliation (the intrinsic motivation argu-
ment); others’ incentives to signal high quality may be affected (the career
concerns argument). Some officers may simply believe that as long as they
are honest, they do not need to work hard because the principal values hon-
esty more than effort. One way or another, the principal may face reduced
incentives on the part of the agent to put in effort. In addition, the effect of
monitoring systems on individual corruption decisions is in question.
The decision to be corrupt results from officers’ attitudes towards corrup-
tion, which might be based on their home-grown moral scruples, the percep-
tion of attitudes towards corruption in their social context, the perception of
risks connected to corrupt behavior, etc. Consequently, some people may be
more prone to corruption than others. In the literature this is modelled as
the psychic cost of corruption (see, for example, Celentani and Ganuza 2002,
or Cule and Fulton 2005). The actual decision to take (or ask for) a bribe
then also depends on the value of the bribe. We say that people who are
conditionally susceptible to taking (or asking for) a bribe are opportunistic.
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When talking about petty police corruption, it is likely that some fraction
of people are honest because their psychic cost of corruption is too high to
outweigh (relatively low) potential monetary gains.1
An authority, or the principal, evaluating the work of police officers,
might, in general, observe no more than their daily output which, for exam-
ple for traffic police, might be measured by the total value of issued tickets.
How much an officer collects in fines, however, depends on several factors:
the effort he is exerting and his corruptibility, but also on the number of mis-
behaving drivers in his area or other exogenous factors. Therefore, an officer
who collects few fines may not necessarily be corrupt or shirking. Thus, the
observed “output” gives the principal only limited information about the ac-
tual behavior of the officer and the incentive-compatibility design of a reward
and punishment system becomes an issue.
Assume that the principal wants to induce a high level of effort and non-
corruptibility. The question I ask is whether, and at what price, the principal
can influence the incentives of officers in the desired way by monitoring them
and thereby acquiring additional information about their type and/or their
action choices.
I examine the effect of the imperfect partial monitoring of an agent (traf-
fic police officer) who has two binary decision margins: (1) unobservable
effort (diligence and time spent pursuing misbehaving drivers); and (2) an
unobservable decision about how much of the produced output to extract
for himself (how many of the violations to fine officially and how many to
“fine” in the form of a bribe). Hence the model captures an element of hid-
den action (effort) with an element of hidden information (the output before
any potential extraction). On top of that, there is another source of hidden
information in that the agent may be intrinsically honest (will never extract
any rents) or opportunistic (will extract rents under the right economic in-
centives). However, the type is not known before signing the contract and
hence this is just another layer of hidden information rather than an element
of adverse selection.
I study and compare three monitoring technologies: (1) No Monitoring,
(2) Monitoring of Corruption, and (3) Monitoring of Effort. If the principal
does not monitor she can only observe output that the agent produces. If
1Alesˇ Pachmann, who was associated with the Police Academy of the Czech Republic,
suggested in private communication that surveys on police corruption suggest about 10%
of police officers being unconditionally honest.
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the principal monitors, the monitoring is partial in that only one decision
margin is monitored and it is imperfect in that the probability of detecting a
lack of effort or corruptibility is less than one. I am interested in the effects
of monitoring on both agent’s effort choice and his corruptibility.
The police officers thus affect the quality of enforcement they are expected
to provide by deciding on the effort and their corruptibility. These two de-
cisions are not completely independent, though. On the one hand, putting
in more effort generates a higher expected output (catching more violating
drivers), which gives the agent more opportunities for rent extraction. On the
other hand, planning to extract a certain fraction of the rent gives the agent
more incentives to exert effort. This generates two key differences from the
career concerns literature, where the result is driven by a certain substitua-
bility between the exogenous ability of the agent and the endogenous effort
decision. First, in the present model, even though the propensity to corrup-
tion is exogenously given to the agent, the actual decision to take bribes is
endogenous and therefore it may respond to economic incentives (whereas
ability in the career concerns literature is out of the agent’s control). Sec-
ond, the interplay of effort choice and corruptibility is more complicated
than in the career concerns literature: high effort increases the probability
of high produced output (before any rent extraction) but, at the same time,
it creates more opportunities for bribery and thereby might reduce observed
output (after any rent extraction). Effort choice and corruptibility are not
substitutes. Consequently, the monitoring is likely to affect the incentives
in a somewhat different way than in the career concerns literature. In fact,
any effect of monitoring on one decision margin may “spill over” to the other
margin as well, which is one of the interesting properties of the model.
The punishment for low effort or rent extraction is the termination of the
contract with the agent. Since at least two periods are necessary to make
monitoring and its consequences for future payoffs an important part of the
incentives package, I construct a two-period principal-agent model in which
a principal offers a two-period contract to an agent of unknown type. In the
contract, the principal commits herself to a monitoring technology and to
wages to be paid to the agent at the end of the employment. The principal
decides, at the end of the first period, based on her monitoring, whether she
will keep her current employee or fire him and hire a new one for the second
period. I assume that the principal is also ex-post exogenously committed
to monitoring and to the firing rule specified in the contract. Monitoring is
costless.
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I define the agent’s type as his predisposition (or propensity) to corrup-
tion. I assume that whether an agent with a given predisposition to corrup-
tion takes a bribe in a given period is a decision that he takes in response to
the reward and punishment system that is in place. To simplify the analysis, I
assume that there are two types of agents in the population: an honest type,
with zero utility from corruption, and a corrupt type, with some positive
utility from corruption.
I assume that before signing the contract the agent does not know his
type.2 I make this assumption to avoid adverse selection, which would make
the agent’s strategy space richer and thereby the analysis more complicated.
Agents discover their types quickly, though. Imagine, for example, a new
officer who has no prior experience either with this kind of a job or with
bribery as such. It is likely to take him only a few transactions to find
out what his “price” is, or whether there is any price at all. To simplify the
analysis, I assume that the agent learns his type the very same moment when
he starts the job. Thus when choosing the effort level, he already makes an
informed decision.
In order to model the exogenous factors mentioned above that make it
impossible for the principal to distinguish the types solely based on the output
realization, I assume that luck will affect the output of both types of agent.
Imagine days with high traffic and lots of speeding drivers (may be caused
by good road conditions) and days when people drive more in compliance
with law (may be caused by poor visibility or other poor road conditions).
In order to keep things as simple as possible, I assume that luck comes into
play only when the agent is exerting a high level of effort.
I assume that two levels of output are possible: low or high. Only a hard-
working and lucky agent produces high output and can extract for himself
through bribes that part of output that is above the output resulting from low
effort.3 This brings about an interesting conflict on the side of the principal:
on the one hand, she prefers high effort as it increases the likelihood of high
output yet, on the other hand, high effort implies also more opportunities for
opportunistic agents to collect bribes. It is therefore not clear whether it is
2In reality, he might have some at least imperfect knowledge but I will abstract from
that for simplicity. The adverse selection case might be an interesting extension of the
model.
3Producing low output and then, in addition, extracting some part of it for himself
would automatically reveal the agent’s type to the principal and hence eliminate any
chance of second-period profits.
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in the principal’s best interest to automatically induce a high level of effort.
In general, the principal might have different preferences about the agent’s
actions. In real-life scenarios, the principal might put more weight on how
much effort the agent puts in, or, alternatively, non-corruptibility might be a
top priority for her. As for the former, imagine the example of traffic police.
Even an opportunistic officer, who is working really hard in order to create
more opportunities for corruption, might produce some, though a smaller,
deterrence effect (compared to a hard-working honest officer). The overall
deterrence might, however, be higher than the one produced by the honest,
but shirking, officer. Therefore, the principal might prefer to concentrate on
the agent’s effort choice. As for the latter, imagine for example a question
of issuing driver’s licences (or some other license or permit for that matter).
In this case, with a relatively well-defined set of criteria, the question of
effort (or, the amount of work dealt with) might be less important than the
question of non-corrupt decision making in order to avoid the possible social
costs that might be generated by, for example, unqualified drivers.
In this chapter, I refrain from making specific assumptions about the
principal’s utility function. Instead, I focus on the decision-making of the
agent and on how his incentives are affected by monitoring. This way, the
conclusions about the agent’s incentives are relatively general, as they do not
depend on the specific preferences of the principal or on the parameters of
the model such as the proportion of honest types. Specifically, I analyze the
case when the principal wants to induce the “most efficient” strategy profile,
which includes high effort and non-corruptibility over both periods.
Cremer (1995) is the article that is most closely related to this study. Cre-
mer used a two-period principal-agent model to demonstrate that increased
monitoring (and hence more information about the agent’s characteristics)
may make it more difficult for the principal to commit to some threats,
thereby weakening the agent’s incentives.
Cremer’s main result draws on the idea of renegotiation-proofness intro-
duced by Dewatripont (1988). Cremer shows that with efficient monitoring
technology (which allows the principal to learn at no cost everything about
the agent’s type/quality and action choices), the only renegotiation-proof
contract will commit the principal to monitoring and to firing the agent who
is found to be of low quality. With an inefficient monitoring technology (for
which the cost of additional information is infinite and which is therefore
analogical to the No Monitoring case), the principal will not conduct mon-
itoring (and will only observe output) and will rehire the agent only if he
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produced high first-period output.
The intuition behind Cremer’s result is that the additional information
prevents the principal from committing to some threats. Assume, for ex-
ample, a situation in which the principal commits to an efficient monitoring
technology and, at the same time, she claims to fire the agent if he produces
low output. The efficient monitoring technology, however, enables the prin-
cipal to observe the reasons underlying low output at no cost. If she observes
that the agent is of high quality and exerted high effort but was unlucky, the
principal would prefer keeping that agent to having to go to the market and
hiring a new agent of unknown characteristics (but of lower average quality).
Knowing that no threat of such a kind would be credible when the efficient
monitoring technology is employed, the agent’s incentives are altered.
In Cremer’s model the agent’s type is his (exogenously given) suitability
for the job which the agent cannot control and, thus, he only decides about
the effort level. This is the most important difference from this chapter, in
which I study the possible effects of monitoring when the agent decides about
both the effort level and corruptibility.
I find a “Cremer-like” result in the case when the principal monitors the
effort choice of the agent. Monitoring of Effort improves the sorting of types.
Consequently, the principal cannot credibly threaten to fire the agent every
time when observing low output. Therefore, the agent might have more in-
centive to be corrupt. To induce high effort and non-corruptibility over both
periods, the principal has to pay a higher expected wage with Monitoring of
Effort than with No Monitoring, to compensate for the lost part of incentives
due to reduced risk of getting fired after the first period. Monitoring of Cor-
ruption, on the other hand, does not improve the sorting of types. Therefore,
the principal’s firing rule after the first period is exactly the same as with
No Monitoring. Consequently, no “Cremer-like” result emerges. Quite on the
contrary, the expected penalty for corruption serves as an additional enforce-
ment mechanism and Monitoring of Corruption negatively affects agent’s
incentives to be corrupt. As a result, the principal can pay a lower ex-
pected wage with Monitoring of Corruption than with No Monitoring (or
with Monitoring of Effort) to induce high effort and non-corruptibility over
both periods.
Importantly, the results suggest that the effect of monitoring one dimen-
sion of the agent’s strategy profile may spill over to the other dimension.
Specifically, my conclusion differs from that in the motivating literature: the
incentives to exert effort are not distorted by monitoring; it is indeed the
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incentive to be corrupt that might be negatively affected if the principal
monitors the agent’s effort choice. This is the main contribution of this
chapter.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 2, I
discuss the model. First, the main assumptions for the agent and for the
principal are presented. Afterwards, I introduce the three types of monitoring
technology. In section 3, I provide a discussion of the main result. All proofs
can be found in the appendix. Section 4 concludes.
1.2 The Model
This section summarizes the main assumptions of the proposed model. An
overview of the key notation for the model is provided in Table 1.1.
p - proportion of honest-type agents in the population
q - probability of being lucky
c - cost of exerting high effort
δc - exogenous probability of detecting corruption
δe - exogenous probability of detecting low effort
F - penalty imposed after detecting corruption
BH/BL - high/low output
A - utility from corruption, A > 0 for the opportunist
wHH/wHL/wLL - two-period wage after producing high+high/high+low/low+low output
wF - wage paid to an agent who is fired after the first period
eH/eL - high/low effort
C/NC - corrupt/non-corrupt
{e1CD1, e2CD2} - agent’s strategy; eiCDi is effort choice and corruptibility decision (CD) in
the period i, i ∈ {1, 2}, ei ∈ {eH , eL}, CDi ∈ {C,NC}
NM - No Monitoring
MC - Monitoring of Corruption
ME - Monitoring of Effort
Table 1.1: Overview of the key notation.
The main assumptions and the basic structure of the model are summa-
rized in Table 1.2. More details are discussed below.
1.2.1 The Agent
There are two types of agent. As in Cremer (1995), I assume that p of them
are good and (1−p) of them are bad, where 0 < p < 1. The good type, which
I will call honest, is constituted of those agents whose psychic cost of engaging
in illegal transactions is high enough to outweigh whatever potential benefits
there may be. The bad type, which I will call opportunistic, is constituted of
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The Agent
is one of two types
· honest type
→ chooses effort level ∈ {eH , eL}
→ is always non-corrupt
· opportunistic type
→ chooses effort level ∈ {eH , eL}
→ decides to be corrupt or non-corrupt
the observed productivity of either type depends on
· chosen effort level ∈ {eH , eL}
· exogenous realization of luck ∈ {lucky, unlucky}
· chosen “corruptibility” ∈ {corrupt, non-corrupt}
The Principal
At the beginning of the 1st period offers a two-period contract in which she
· commits to a monitoring technology
→ No Monitoring (NM) – the principal can only observe out-
put realization
→ Monitoring of Corruption (MC) – the principal can ob-
serve output and with probability δc also detect corruption
→ Monitoring of Effort (ME) – the principal can observe out-
put and with probability δe also detect low effort
· specifies two-period wages (wHH , wHL, wLL) and the “firing” wage (wF )
· specifies conditions under which the agent’s employment continues after the
first period
At the end of the 1st period
· implements monitoring technology
· decides whether to keep or fire the agent based on the outcome
of the monitoring and conditions stated in the contract
→ if she keeps the agent, nothing changes and the two-period
contract is fulfilled
→ if she fires the agent, she terminates the two-period con-
tract, pays the agent the “firing” wage wF , and offers a
one-period contract to a new agent.
At the end of the 2nd period
· pays wages according to the applicable contract.
Table 1.2: Summary of the model.
those agents with lower psychic costs, who may be corruptible if the expected
benefit of doing so is high enough. An opportunistic agent who decides to
take bribes in a given period will be called corrupt; if he decides not to take
bribes in a given period, he will be called non-corrupt.4
4Throughout the text, “honest type”/“honest agent” and “opportunistic
type”/“opportunistic agent”/“opportunist” will always refer to an agent’s type (his
given (non)propensity to corruption). “Corrupt” (“non-corrupt”) will refer to the
opportunistic agent’s decision to (not) take bribes in a given period.
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Both types choose an effort level, which can take one of two possible
values: high (eH), or low (eL). If the agent exerts high effort, he bears a cost
of c, c > 0. The cost of exerting low effort is normalized to zero.
Two levels of output are possible – high output (BH) and low output
(BL). BH is assumed to be strictly greater than BL. If exerting low effort,
the agent of either type automatically produces low output. Both types
of agent are capable of producing high output BH . The only difference is
that an opportunist may, through bribery, extract the difference between
high and low output, and thus, at the end of the day the principal will
observe low output BL. If the agent exerts high effort, then the output he
produces further depends on two things: (exogenous) luck and the agent’s
corruptibility. Denote the probability of being lucky q, 0 < q < 1. The
unlucky agent produces low output. The lucky agent produces high output.
The decision to be corrupt depends on the agent’s utility from corruption.
I assume that the agent’s utility from corruption is A. A represents the
agent’s utility from extracting for himself through bribes that part of output
that is above the output resulting from low effort;5 it also factors in the
agent’s psychic cost of corruption. It is not necessary for the purpose of this
chapter to specify how exactly these factors enter A, though.
For the honest type, I assume that A is equal to zero (their psychic cost
of corruption is too high). The opportunists have one specific value of A > 0
which is common knowledge.
An opportunistic agent can be corrupt only on lucky days, when he can
gain A by extracting the difference between BH and BL for himself. If the
opportunist is corrupt, the principal will observe low output BL. Thus, in
fact, the realization of an agent’s type is in fact equivalent with the realization
of A; A is a parametric representation of the type.
I assume that the agent does not know “his” A before starting the job.
However, I assume that he learns it right after he starts working and thus is
able to adjust the effort level instantly.
5With the minimum output being BL, the agent can, essentially, extract part of the
difference between BH and BL. One could specify A as A = α(BH −BL), where α < 1 –
the agent extracts a linear part of the “extra output” and α < 1 accounts for the psychic
cost of corruption as well as some cost of bargaining (a bribe is typically lower than an
actual penalty would be). For the sake of generality I, however, refrain from specifying
such a specific relationship between gain from corruption and output. It is not necessary
for the purpose of this paper.
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1.2.2 The Principal
A risk-neutral principal offers a two-period contract to an agent of unknown
characteristics. Before signing the contract neither the principal nor the
agent know the agent’s A; only the probability p of the distribution of A in
the population is known.
In the two-period contract, the principal specifies the monitoring tech-
nology, wages to be paid after the second period, conditions under which the
contract continues after the first period and the wage to be paid to the agent
in case he is fired after the first period.
After observing the outcome of the first period (how much information is
being observed depends on the chosen monitoring technology), the principal
decides whether to continue the contract or to fire the agent and to offer a
one-period contract to an agent of unknown characteristics. Note that the
monitoring, if the principal commits to it, occurs only after the first period,
i.e. the principal does not monitor after the second period.6
The two-period wages are contingent on observed output and also depend
on the rehiring decision of the principal. Wages are paid at the end of the
employment. The principal will pay wHH after observing high output in both
periods; wHL after observing a combination of high and low output over two
periods;7 wLL after observing low output in both periods;
8 and, finally, she
will pay wF in the case when she fires the agent based on the outcome of the
first period (including monitoring in relevant cases).
6In this, I follow Cremer’s approach. The monitoring, by giving (or not) additional
information to the principal after the first period, should in general affect the sorting of
the agents after the first period and thereby affect the incentives of the agent. The purpose
of this paper is to explore in which direction the incentives are affected. The second period
is important ex-ante, so that the agent needs to optimize over two periods and monitoring
in between, when deciding about his actions. Basically, the second period captures the
lost opportunity of the agent who misbehaves and might be fired afterwards.
7Here I implicitly assume symmetry, wHL = wLH , as in both cases a total output of
BH+BL is produced. Note that with some monitoring technologies the agent will be fired
after producing BL in the first period, in which case he will be paid wF . The details will
be discussed later on, as the firing rule is specific to the monitoring technologies chosen
and it is part of the results to be shown.
8Here, the same comment applies as for wHL - as with some monitoring technologies,
the agent will be fired after delivering low output, wLL will not always be relevant. More
details follow later on.
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1.2.3 Monitoring Technologies
Based on the agent’s strategy space and on the preferences of the princi-
pal, three monitoring technologies seem relevant. First, the benchmark case,
which I will call No Monitoring (NM), in which the principal does not mon-
itor the agent. Second, the case in which the principal can monitor the
corruptibility of the agent and discover it with some positive probability. I
will call this case Monitoring of Corruption (MC). Finally, the case in which
the principal can monitor the effort the agent puts in and discover shirk-
ing with some positive probability. I will call this case Monitoring of Effort
(ME).
All three monitoring technologies affect the agent’s incentives to exert a
high level of effort and to be corrupt; how exactly they affect the agent’s
incentives is my primary focus.
No Monitoring (NM)
In this case the principal can only observe output at the end of the first
period.
Table 1.3 summarizes all the possible combinations of the agent’s type,
his decisions (about effort and corruptibility), nature’s moves (luck) and the
result observed by the principal (level of output) after the first period. The
two-period case is analogous but more complicated, as it involves combina-
tions of the agent’s actions and nature’s moves over two periods. Moreover,
the continuation of the employment into the second period depends on the
outcome observed by the principal after the first period.
type effort luck corruptibility observed
output
high (eH) lucky non-corrupt (NC) BH
HONEST NOT lucky non-corrupt (NC) BL
low (eL) – non-corrupt (NC) BL
high (eH) lucky non-corrupt (NC) BH
OPPORTUNIST corrupt (C) BL
NOT lucky non-corrupt (NC) BL
low (eL) – non-corrupt (NC) BL
Table 1.3: Possible combinations of type, effort, luck, corruptibility and observed output;
eH/eL stand for high/low effort, NC/C for non-corrupt/corrupt and BH/BL for high/low
output.
Note that the principal observes high output only if she employs either
an honest type who exerts high effort and is lucky, or an opportunist who
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exerts high effort, is lucky and is non-corrupt. In all other cases, the principal
observes low output. Consequently, she is not able to distinguish which type
she is currently employing based on observed output.
Monitoring of Corruption (MC)
In this case, the principal has access to a technology that allows her to detect
corruption with some nonzero probability. I assume that this technology
returns no false positive – it does not detect the agent as corrupt if he has not
been corrupt. The agent who has been corrupt is detected with probability
δc, where 0 < δc < 1, and detection leads to punishment with certainty.
Thus, after being detected, the agent is fired. In addition, he is punished by
an external law-enforcing authority and a fine F is imposed on him. The fine
F and the detection rate δc are exogenous parameters.
9
The principal monitors the agent after observing low output in the first
period.
Monitoring of Effort (ME)
In this case, the principal has a technology that allows her to detect low
effort. As in the previous case, I assume that the technology returns no false
positive – it does not detect the agent as exerting low effort if he has not
exerted low effort. The agent who has exerted low effort is detected with
probability δe, where 0 < δe < 1. After being detected, the agent is fired
with certainty. The detection rate δe is an exogenous parameter.
10
The principal monitors the agent after observing low output in the first
period.
9Typically, the penalties are set by law and collected by an external authority. It is,
however, not crucial for this paper who in fact collects the fine, as it is not my goal to
identify the optimal contract for the principal; rather I look at incentives of the agent and
how they are affected by various monitoring technologies. In the case when the principal
would collect the fine, F could be, in fact, simply a part of the wage. As regards the
detection rate, one can think of it as the quality (or effectiveness) of the feasible monitoring
technology.
10One can think of δe as the quality (or effectiveness) of the feasible monitoring tech-
nology. With ME, I do not assume an additional external punishment in the form of a
penalty, as exerting low effort is not an illegal action.
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1.3 Results
Before discussing the details, Table 1.4 below provides a brief overview of
the main results. Specifically, I am looking for the effect that Monitoring of
Corruption and Monitoring of Effort (as opposed to No Monitoring) have on:
1) sorting of types (“Does the information from MC/ME help the principal to
fine-tune her firing rule?”); and 2) incentives of the agent to be non-corrupt
and to exert effort.
Sorting Non-Corruptibility Effort
MC − ↑ −
ME ↑ ↓ −
Table 1.4: Effects of Monitoring of Corruption (MC) and Monitoring of Effort (ME) on
the sorting of types, agents’ corruptibility and effort choice. “↑” corresponds to a positive
effect, “↓” corresponds to a negative effect, and “−” corresponds to no effect.
Assumption 1 Throughout the analysis, I assume that the principal prefers
the honest type to exert high effort.
In the simplest case, when the principal would set wages such that the
honest type would prefer exerting low effort over both periods (the principal
might want to do that to reduce her cost), the opportunist would prefer either
low effort (when qA < c) or high effort and being corrupt (when qA > c). In
either case, in the end both types would deliver low output. Consequently,
firing and replacing the agent with a new one could not help to improve
efficiency. Basically, I assume that the levels of output are such that the
improvement in efficiency of the honest type outweighs the cost in wages
to the principal. This assumption allows concentrating on (strategically)
interesting cases and helps to simplify the analysis.
The principal’s Bayesian updating, after observing the first-period output
and the result of the monitoring, gives the first result:
Proposition 1 Monitoring of Corruption does not improve the sorting of
types. Monitoring of Effort improves the sorting of types if the probability of
detection is high enough.
Improved sorting means that, based on the result of monitoring, the prin-
cipal can fine-tune her firing rule (compared to NM) so as to improve her
probability of having an honest type for the second period.
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The detailed proof can be found in the appendix,; a discussion follows
below.
With all three monitoring technologies, there are, in general, three pos-
sible first-period strategy profiles for the opportunist: {eHC}, {eHNC},
{eLNC}. According to Assumption 1, the principal always prefers the honest
type to exert high effort eH . Altogether, there are three possible strategy pro-
files that the principal might wish to induce in the first period: eH , {eHNC},
eH , {eHC}, and eH{eLNC}, where the first term denotes the strategy of
the honest agent and the second term, in the braces, the strategy of the
opportunist. Depending on the particular contract the principal offers, the
outcome of the first period can give her more or less information about the
type of the agent she is employing. To prove Proposition 1 I compute for
each monitoring technology the updated (a-posteriori) probabilities of having
an honest type for all possible first-period strategy profiles and the observed
outcomes of the first period. Then I compare the a-posteriori probability of
having an honest type with the proportion of honest types on the market.
With No Monitoring, the only information the principal has after the first
period is the realization of output. In the first case, when eH , {eHNC} is
induced in the first period, if high output is observed, it could have been
produced by either an honest or an opportunistic lucky agent. Similarly, if
low output is observed, it could have been produced by either an honest or
an opportunistic unlucky agent. After the first period, the principal has no
additional information about the type of the agent compared to the start of
the employment and thus her best prediction about the probability that she
is indeed employing an honest agent is p. The probability that she would
hire an honest agent if she fires her current employee and goes to the market
again is the same. Therefore she is indifferent between keeping and firing the
currently employed agent.
In the other two cases, when eH , {eHC} or eH , {eLNC} is induced in the
first period, if high output is observed, the principal knows with certainty
that she is employing an honest agent, and she prefers to keep this agent
to firing him and employing a new agent of unknown characteristics. If low
output is observed, than the a-posteriori probability of having an honest type
is lower than the proportion of honest types on the market and therefore, the
principal would be better off firing her current employee and hiring a new
agent.
Thus, in this case the principal will ex-ante commit to the following firing
rule: “I will keep the agent who has produced high output and will fire the
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agent after observing low output.” Ex-post, the principal cannot be better
off by not keeping her ex-ante firing rule.
With Monitoring of Corruption, the principal can in addition detect a
corrupt agent with some probability. After observing low output, detection
is a sufficient signal that the current employee is indeed opportunistic. Un-
fortunately, no detection is not a sufficient signal of having an honest type
(the a-posteriori probability of having honest type is lower than the propor-
tion of honest types on the market). So, in the end, the principal will fire the
agent after observing low output, no matter what the result of monitoring is.
She will keep the agent who has produced high output. Thus, the principal’s
firing rule will be the same as in the NM case.11
With Monitoring of Effort, the principal can detect a shirking agent with
some probability. After observing low output, detection is a sufficient signal
that the current employee is indeed opportunistic. Unlike with MC, no de-
tection is a sufficient signal of having an honest type (a-posteriori probability
of having an honest type is higher than the proportion of the honest type on
the market) if the detection probability δe > q. When eH , {eHC} is induced,
ME always returns “no detection” as the opportunist is exerting high effort
and thus ME cannot help to obtain additional information. Therefore, in this
case, the principal will always fire after observing low output. Altogether,
with ME, the principal’s firing rule will be based directly on the outcome of
the monitoring.12
This result might seem surprising at first, but it is in fact a consequence
of the structure of the model. Recall that only those opportunists who exert
high effort and are lucky can collect bribes (as a part of the “above-the-
minimum” output) which, as I argued at the beginning, is indeed a real-
istic assumption. Thus, corruptibility is conditional on good luck. Conse-
quently, with MC, some opportunists are not detected because the detection
11Even though the information generated by the monitoring in this case is not sufficient
to improve the sorting of the types (and thus the informational value of the test might seem
negligible), it will be shown later that Monitoring of Corruption does affect the incentives
of the agent in the desired way and therefore the principal might want to commit to
conducting it.
12This improvement in sorting is a possible value added to the principal. The principal,
for whom non-corruptibility of her agents is the top priority, might want to bear the extra
cost (it will be shown later that the principal has to pay higher expected wages with ME)
connected to ME in order to sort out the opportunists. As I said, it is not the purpose
of this paper to specify the optimal contract of the principal but rather to explore the
possible effects of monitoring on agents’ incentives.
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technology has failed, others are not detected because “luck did not bring
them enough opportunities” to be corrupt. With ME, every opportunist who
chooses to exert low effort can be detected. Thus, with MC a smaller propor-
tion of opportunists is detected and therefore, no detection is not a sufficient
signal for the principal to keep the agent.
Assumption 2 From now on, I will assume that the principal has access to
a Monitoring of Effort technology that is successful enough or, that δe > q.
Table 1.5 summarizes the firing rules for all three monitoring technologies.
The principal will ex ante commit to these firing rules in the contract. Ex
post, the principal cannot be better off not keeping her ex-ante rule.
eH , {eHNC} eH , {eHC} eH , {eLNC}
BH BL BH BL +ND BL +D BH BL +ND BL +D
MN keep fire keep fire keep fire
MC keep fire keep fire fire keep fire
ME keep keep keep fire keep keep fire
Table 1.5: Summary of the firing rules with all three monitoring technologies: NM, MC,
and ME; eH/eL stand for high/low effort, NC/C for non-corrupt/corrupt, BH/BL for
high/low output, and D/ND for “detection”/“no detection.”
Assumption 3 From now on, I will assume that the expected gain from
corruption is greater than the cost of exerting high effort, thus qA > c.
The further results of the model depend on how the expected gain from
corruption compares to the cost of exerting high effort. Depending on that,
the opportunist might prefer high effort and corruptibility to exerting low
effort or vice versa, which has important consequences for the implementabil-
ity of various strategy profiles. Therefore, I will distinguish two cases, when
qA ≤ c and when qA > c.
The first case is less interesting because in the benchmark case, with
No Monitoring, corruption does not exist. Recall that both {eHC} and
{eLNC} lead to low observed output and thereby to firing with certainty.
As the expected (net) gain of corruption qA− c is negative, the opportunist
will be better off exerting low effort than exerting high effort and collecting
bribes. Therefore, corruption is not an issue even without monitoring and
the principal-agent interaction becomes, in this case, just a simple problem
of effort choice.
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The second case is more interesting: corruption is not suppressed by the
choice of parameters and can occur with all three monitoring technologies.
In fact, as the expected (net) gain of corruption qA − c is positive, the
opportunist (unless he is provided extra incentives), prefers eHC to eLNC in
a single period. Given the interdependence of effort choice and corruptibility,
this is an interesting case when the interplay of the incentives to extract bribes
and to exert effort becomes an issue. As the purpose of this chapter is to
examine various effects of monitoring technologies on agent’s corruptibility
and effort level, I will concentrate on this case.
Proposition 2 summarizes the main result for Monitoring of Corruption
assuming that the principal (exogenously) commits to monitoring and to the
optimal firing rule as specified above.
Proposition 2 The wages sufficient to ensure both high effort and non-
corruptibility over both periods are lower with Monitoring of Corruption than
with No Monitoring.
The proof can be found in the appendix. Intuitively, the principal has
two main channels of influencing the agent’s incentives: the threat of firing
after the first period and an incentive-compatible payment scheme (including
expected penalty). As to the first, MC does not improve the sorting of types
and the firing rule of the principal does not change compared to NM: the
principal keeps the agent only after observing high output; low observed
output leads to firing with certainty. With an unchanged firing rule, the
risk of getting fired is exactly the same as with NM. Consequently, there is
no “Cremer-like” (negative) effect on the incentives of the agent that would
result from the reduced risk of getting fired.13 As to the second, in the case of
detection, the agent is fired and penalized. Therefore, the threat of penalty
serves as an additional enforcement mechanism compared to the NM case.
Consequently a lower wage compensation is sufficient from the principal to
induce non-corruptibility.
To put it differently, with MC, “No Corruption” is the binding constraint.
With qA > c, with the threat of getting fired after delivering low output, and
with binary effort choice, the principal offers a wage premium to induce non-
corruptibility as opposed to corruptibility (and not to induce high effort as
13Recall that according to Cremer (1995) additional information prevents the princi-
pal from committing to some threats and therefore might be detrimental to the agent’s
incentives.
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opposed to low effort). Once the principal bans corruption (imagine δ = 1),
she no longer needs to “bribe” the agent not to take bribes and therefore she
can lower the wage a little bit and still ensure his non-corruptibility. Thus,
MC allows maintaining high effort and non-corruptibility with a lower wage.
The presence of the expected penalty allows the principal to change the
wage structure, which results in lower expected wage for the agent but the
threat of firing after the first period maintains the incentives to exert effort.14
Monitoring of Effort is more interesting, as in this case, the principal’s
firing rule is based on the result of monitoring (and it is different than with
NM), which is why a“Cremer-like” (negative) effect on agent’s incentives can
be expected. Proposition 3 summarizes the main result for ME, assuming
that the principal (exogenously) commits to monitoring and to the optimal
firing rule as specified above.
Proposition 3 The wages necessary to ensure both high effort and non-
corruptibility over both periods are higher with Monitoring of Effort than
with No Monitoring.
A detailed proof can be found in the appendix. When the principal wants
to induce high effort and non-corruptibility over two periods from both types
of agent, with No Monitoring the wages wHH = 2A − (qA − c), wHL =
A− (qA− c), and wF = 0 are sufficient; with Monitoring of Effort, she has to
offer wHH = 2A, wHL = A, wLL = 0, and wF = 0 to induce the same strategy
profile. It follows immediately from Assumption 1 that the No-Monitoring
wages are lower.
This result has the flavor of Cremer’s (1995) main result: additional infor-
mation to the principal about the agent makes some threats not credible and
thereby weakens the incentives of the agent. Consequently, in order to induce
the same strategy profile, the principal has to compensate with higher wages.
The optimal firing rule for ME is different than for NM, as “no detection”
14A simple exercise can be done to illustrate how MC affects the incentives of the
agent. Assume that the principal would commit to the NM technology but with (lower)
MC-incentive-compatible wages. All the other conditions of the contract would remain
unchanged. It is easy to show that in such a case the opportunist would switch to {eHC}
in the first period (and get fired afterwards). Importantly, the absence of monitoring and
of the expected penalty results in increased corruption. Given that qA > c and that both
{eHC} and {eLNC} lead to firing with certainty, the agent prefers {eHC} to {eLNC} in
the first period. Either higher wages or the threat of penalty are necessary to ensure the
non-corruptibility of the agent.
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is a sufficient signal for the principal to keep the agent even after delivering
low output. Consequently, as in Cremer (1995), the principal cannot credibly
threaten to fire every agent who has delivered low output, which weakens the
incentives of the agent.
ME affects the incentives of the honest type to exert high effort and
the incentives of the opportunistic type to be non-corrupt. The binding
constraint is, again, the one ensuring non-corruptibility of the opportunistic
type. Let me illustrate why.
First, assume the extreme case when the monitoring technology is per-
fect, and thus δ = 1. The honest type will continue exerting high effort,
because otherwise he would be detected and fired with certainty. The op-
portunist, however, even when δ = 1, has incentives to switch to {eHC} and
here is why.15 With NM, going from {eHNC} to {eHC} would increase his
probability of getting fired from (1− q) to 1 as {eHC} leads to low observed
output and firing. With ME, on the other hand, his probability of getting
fired would drop to zero, as after observing low output the principal would
monitor the agent and the test for low effort would return “no detection.”
Clearly, the incentives to switch to {eHC} are stronger with ME than with
NM, and that is why the principal has to“bribe” the agent not to take bribes.
Second, when the monitoring technology is not perfect, and thus δ < 1,
the incentives of the honest type will be affected. In this case, the honest
type’s probability of getting fired after exerting low effort would be 1 with
NM (because he delivers low output he is fired), whereas it is only δ < 1 with
ME. Therefore, as in Cremer (1995), the principal has to compensate what
is lost on incentives due to the “lower threat of firing” by offering a higher
wage to the agent.
The fact that the binding constraint is that on non-corruptibility follows
from the assumption that qA > c (Assumption 3 ) and thus the opportunist
always prefers {eHC} to {eLNC}.16 Consequently, when the constraint on
non-corruptibility is binding, the incentive-compatibility constraint of the
honest type to exert effort is satisfied automatically. If we were to reduce the
15Assume that the principal offers wages to induce high effort and non-corruptibility
over both periods. I want to compare the incentives of the opportunist to switch {eHC}
in the first period under NM vs. ME. Also, keep in mind Assumption 3 that qA > C,
which ensures that the opportunist always prefers high effort and corruption to exerting
low effort.
16This assumption ensures that the expected gain from corruption is sufficient to com-
pensate for the cost of high effort and therefore corruption is indeed a problem.
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wages, such that the effort constraint would be binding, the opportunistic
type would switch to corruption (see Proposition 4 below). Importantly,
the higher wages that the principal has to offer with ME to ensure that the
opportunistic type is non-corrupt are high enough to also ensure that the
honest type exerts high effort.
To support the above arguments and to illustrate how exactly the in-
centives of the two types are affected by ME, I also did a simple exercise
looking at a hybrid monitoring technology which combines some properties
of No Monitoring and of Monitoring of Effort. The results are summarized
in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 ME can negatively affect the opportunist’s incentives to be
non-corrupt.
a) When the principal maintains the same {eHNC, eHNC} wages as with
NM while introducing ME, the opportunist’s strategy profile will involve
corruption. The incentives of the honest type are not distorted.
b) When the principal implements ME but cannot offer higher expected
wages than with NM,17 the best strategy profile {eHNC, eHNC} is no
longer implementable.
The detailed proof can be found in the appendix. When the principal
offers the NM wages, wHH = 2A − (qA − c), wHL = A − (qA − c), and
wF = 0, to induce {eHNC, eHNC} but introduces ME,18 the opportunist no
longer prefers {eHNC, eHNC}. Instead, he will prefer {eHNC, eHC}. Thus,
when the principal introduces ME with (lower) NM wages, the second-period
incentives are distorted and, specifically, they invoke corruption. Intuitively,
the second period incentives are the first to be affected by lower wages, as
there is no monitoring after the second period. Given that qA > c the
opportunist always prefers {eHC} to {eLNC} in a one-period horizon. As
lower wages are weakening the incentives of the opportunist, he will naturally
switch to eHC rather than to {eLNC} to be able to extract extra qA−c > 0.
The incentives of the honest type to exert effort are not distorted, which is,
17Thus, the contract that the principal offers has all the properties of ME but her budget
constraint does not allow her to pay more (in expectations) than she would with NM.
18Thus, the contract that the principal offers has all the properties of ME, just the wages
that she offers are the NM-incentive-compatible wages.
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as I discussed above, a consequence of qA > c, an assumption which ensures
that when reducing the wages, it is first the constraint on non-corruptibility
that breaks down, while the effort constraint is still satisfied.
The proof of part b) can be also found in the appendix. When the prin-
cipal implements Monitoring of Effort but does not want to spend, in expecta-
tion, more than with No Monitoring, the best strategy profile {eHNC, eHNC}
is no longer implementable. Therefore, the principal, depending on her pref-
erences, would have to offer a contract that would induce an alternative
strategy profile.
1.4 Conclusion
In the two-period principal-agent model in which an agent of unknown propen-
sity to corruption decides about his effort level and corruptibility (both his
action choices hidden to the principal), I show that imperfect partial Mon-
itoring of Effort with a high enough detection rate improves the sorting of
types. It might, however, also support agent’s incentive to be corrupt. In
contrast, Monitoring of Corruption does not improve the sorting of types and
it negatively affects the incentive of the agent to be corrupt.
In particular, I show that when the expected gain from corruption is high
enough and corruption might exist with No Monitoring, it is more expensive
for the principal to induce a high level of effort and non-corruptibility over
two periods with Monitoring of Effort than with No Monitoring. Monitoring
of Effort positively affects the incentive of the agent to be corrupt. This
result is in line with earlier findings in the career concerns literature (Cremer
1995; Holmstro¨m 1999; Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole 1999; Prat 2005) that
additional information to the principal about her agent prevents the principal
to credibly commit to some threats and thereby might weaken the incentives
of the agent to exert high effort in order to signal high ability. In contrast,
Monitoring of Corruption, even though it does not improve the sorting of
types – or, in fact, thanks to it – does not have this detrimental effect on the
agent’s incentives. With Monitoring of Corruption, the principal does not
rely on the result of monitoring (specifically, “no detection” is not a sufficient
signal to keep the agent for the second period) and therefore, the firing rule
is the same as with No Monitoring. Consequently, there is no “Cremer-like”
negative impact on the agent’s incentives. As the expected penalty serves as
an additional enforcement mechanism, lower expected wages are necessary
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to induce high effort and non-corruptibility over two periods than with No
Monitoring (and than with Monitoring of Effort).
A policy implication can be drawn from the results. When the agent’s
propensity to corruption is hidden to the principal, and when the agent’s ac-
tions are not directly observable and might also depend on exogenous random
realization (luck), the principal might want to rely on an (stricter) output-
contingent firing rule and monitor for corruption even though this monitoring
technology does not improve the sorting of types. Monitoring of Effort is infe-
rior to both Monitoring of Corruption and No Monitoring, in that it distorts
the incentives to be non-corrupt. This conclusion is drawn for the principal
who wants to induce the most efficient strategy profile that involves high
effort and non-corruptibility over both periods.
A conclusion can be drawn also for the case of Czech traffic police officers
that motivated this investigation. The cameras installed in the police cars,
even if one would doubt their effectiveness as a mean of detecting corrup-
tion and providing admissible evidence, could help to improve the officers’
incentives when implemented together with a properly designed reward and
punishment system.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. With all three monitoring technologies, there
are three possible first-period strategy profiles for the opportunist: eHC,
eHNC, eLNC. According to Assumption 1, the principal always prefers the
honest type to exert high effort. The principal can offer various contracts
(various wages to induce various two-period strategy profiles of the oppor-
tunist), each of which would involve one of the above-mentioned first-period
strategies.
For each monitoring technology, I compute the probability of having
an honest type given the induced first-period strategy profile and observed
outcome of the first period (including monitoring, if relevant). Recall the
Bayesian updating rule:
P (honest/outcome) =
P [honest] · P [outcome/honest]
P [outcome]
19
NM: With NM, the only new information the principal has after the first
period is the output realization.
1) If eH , {eHNC} is induced, then P [honest/BL] = (1−q)p(1−q) = p and
P [honest/BH ] =
qp
q
= p. Thus the a-posteriori probability of having an
honest type is the same as the a-priori probability (and as the probability of
the honest type on the market) after both BH and BL. Therefore in this case,
the principal is indifferent between keeping and firing her current employee.
P [honest/BH ] =
qp
q
= p
2) If eH , {eHC} is induced, then P [honest/BL] = (1−q)p(1−pq) < p. Thus the
the a-posteriori probability of having an honest type is lower than the a-priori
probability. More importantly, it is lower than the probability of obtaining
an honest type on the market. Therefore in this case, the principal would
be better off firing her current employee and hiring a new one for the second
period after observing BL. As P [honest/BH ] = 1, the principal wants to
keep her current employee after observing BH .
3) If eH , {eLNC} is induced, then P [honest/BL] = (1−q)p(1−pq) < p. Thus
the the a-posteriori probability of having an honest type is lower than the
a-priori probability (and than the probability of obtaining an honest type
19Note that Table 1.3 provides a review of all the possible combinations of the agent’s
type, decisions, luck, and observed output after the first period, which can be useful for
the computations of these probabilities.
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on the market). Therefore in this case, the principal would be better off
firing her current employee and hiring a new one for the second period after
observing BL. As P [honest/BH ] = 1, the principal wants to keep her current
employee after observing BH .
All in all, the principal will fire her current employee after observing low
output and keep the agent otherwise.
MC: With MC, the principal observes output and the result of Monitoring
of Corruption after the first period. Therefore, the “outcome” has now two
components: “observed output” and “detection (D) or no detection (ND).”
Note that the honest type is never corrupt and therefore never detected and
thus P [honest/BL + D] = 0 always (and P [opportunistic/BL + D] = 1 so
detection will always lead to firing). Also, the principal does not monitor
after observing BH as a “misbehaving” agent never produces high output.
1) If eH , {eHNC} is induced, then P [honest/BL+ND] = (1−q)p(1−q) = p, and
P [honest/BH ] = p. Thus in this case, the principal is indifferent between
keeping and firing her current employee.
2) If eH , {eHC} is induced, then P [honest/BL +ND] = (1−q)p(1−pq−qδc+pqδc) <
p, and P [honest/BH ] = 1. Thus in this case, the principal would be better
off firing her current employee after observing low output (with detection as
well as without) and hiring a new one for the second period. She will only
keep her current employee after observing high output.
3) If eH , {eLNC} is induced, then P [honest/BL+ND] = (1−q)p(1−pq) < p, and
P [honest/BH ] = 1. Thus in this case, the principal would be better off firing
her current employee after observing low output (with detection as well as
without) and hiring a new one for the second period. She will only keep her
current employee after observing high output.
All in all, the principal’s firing rule will be the same as in the NM case.
Even though the updated probabilities of having an honest type after the first
period are not the same as with NM, the principal does not acquire sufficient
information to base the firing upon the result of the monitoring. Or, to say
it differently, no detection is not a sufficient signal of having an honest type.
Therefore, similarly as with NM, the principal will fire her current employee
after observing low output and keep the agent otherwise.
ME: With ME, the principal observes output and the result of Monitor-
ing of Effort after the first period. Therefore, the “outcome” now has two
components: “observed output” and “detection (D) or no detection (ND).”
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Note that the principal always prefers the honest type to exert high effort and
therefore P [honest/BL +D] = 0 always (and P [opportunistic/BL +D] = 1
so detection will always lead to firing). Also, the principal does not monitor
after observing BH as a “misbehaving” agent never produces high output.
1) If eH , {eHNC} is induced, then P [honest/BL+ND] = (1−q)p(1−q) = p, and
P [honest/BH ] = p. Thus in this case, the principal is indifferent between
keeping and firing her current employee.
2) If eH , {eHC} is induced, then P [honest/BL + ND] = (1−q)p(1−pq) < p, and
P [honest/BH ] = 1. Thus in this case, the principal would be better off firing
her current employee after observing low output (with detection as well as
without) and hiring a new one for the second period. She will only keep her
current employee after observing high output.
3) If eH , {eLNC} is induced, then P [honest/BL+ND] = (1−q)p(1−δe+pδe−pq) > p
if δe > q, and P [honest/BH ] = 1. Thus in this case, the principal would be
better off keeping her current employee after observing low output and no
detection as well as after observing high output. She will only fire after
detection.
All in all, with ME, the principal can base her firing rule on the outcome
of the monitoring. When eHC is induced then low output is a sufficient signal
for firing the agent. When eLNC is induced, then no detection is a sufficient
signal of having an honest type if δe > q. Therefore, the principal will fire
her current employee in two cases: if a) eHC is induced and BL is observed,
or b) eLNC is induced and BL + D is observed. Thus, ME improves the
sorting of types.
Proof of Proposition 2. For both NM and MC I will set up the princi-
pal’s problems. The principal minimizes the expected wage such that the
strategy profile {eHNC, eHNC} from both types is incentive-compatible.
NM: Recall that with NM after delivering low output in the first period
the agent is fired with certainty. The principal maximizes
−q[qwHH + (1− q)wHL]− (1− q)wF .
The second-period incentives of the honest type are ensured by
qwHH + (1− q)wHL − c ≥ wHL.
The first-period incentives of the honest type are ensured by
q[qwHH + (1− q)wHL − c] + (1− q)wF − c ≥ wF .
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The opportunist must, in addition, prefer being non-corrupt to being
corrupt. The opportunist’s second-period incentives are therefore ensured by
qwHH + (1− q)wHL − c ≥ wHL,
qwHH + (1− q)wHL − c ≥ wHL + qA− c.
The first period incentives of the opportunist are ensured by
q[qwHH + (1− q)wHL − c] + (1− q)wF − c ≥ wF ,
q[qwHH + (1− q)wHL − c] + (1− q)wF − c ≥ wF + qA− c.
The agent’s (ex-ante) participation constraint is
q[qwHH + (1− q)wHL − c] + (1− q)wF − c ≥ 0.
The participation constraint does not depend on probability p as both
types are induced the same strategy profile. It is easy to show that given the
incentive-compatibility and non-negativity constraints on wages, the agents’
participation constraint holds as well.
The optimal wages satisfying the incentive-compatibility constraints are
wHH = (2− q)A+ c, wHL = (1− q)A+ c, wF = 0.
MC: Recall that with MC the firing rule is the same as with NM. The
principal maximizes
−q[qwHH + (1− q)wHL]− (1− q)wF .
The incentives of the honest agent are ensured by
qwHH + (1− q)wHL − c ≥ wHL,
q2wHH + q(1− q)wHL + (1− q)wF − (1 + q)c ≥ wF .
The incentives of the opportunist are ensured by
qwHH + (1− q)wHL − c ≥ wHL,
qwHH + (1− q)wHL − c ≥ wHL + qA− c,
q2wHH + q(1− q)wHL + (1− q)wF − (1 + q)c ≥ wF ,
q2wHH + q(1− q)wHL + (1− q)wF − (1 + q)c ≥ wF + q(A− δcF )− c.
The agent’s (ex-ante) participation constraint is
q[qwHH + (1− q)wHL − c] + (1− q)wF − c ≥ 0.
The participation constraint does not depend on probability p as both
types are induced the same strategy profile. It is easy to show that given the
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incentive-compatibility and non-negativity constraints on wages, the agents’
participation constraint holds as well.
The optimal wages satisfying the incentive-compatibility constraints are:
i)for c ≥ q(A− δcF ) and
ia) for A ≤ (1+q)cq2 : wHH = (1− q)A+ (1+q)cq , wHL = −qA+ (1+q)cq , wF = 0,
ib) for A > (1+q)cq2 : wHH = A,wHL = wF = 0.
ii) for c < q(A− δcF ) and
iia) for A ≤ (1+q)cq2 orA > (1+q)cq2 & F ≤ (1−q)A+cδc :
wHH = (2− q)A+ c− δcF,wHL = (1− q)A+ c− δcF,wF = 0, or
iib) for A > (1+q)cq2 & F >
(1−q)A+c
δc
: wHH = A,wHL = wF = 0.
As qA > c, it is easy to show that all the MC wages are lower than wages
with MN. Also the ex-ante expected wage cost to the principal is lower with
MC for all parameters. Thus, it is more expensive for the principal to induce
the same strategy profile with NM than with MC.
Proof of Proposition 3. Now I need to set up the principal’s problem
for ME. The principal minimizes the expected wage such that the strategy
profile {eHNC, eHNC} from both types is incentive-compatible.
NM: Recall that with NM, the optimal wages satisfying the incentive-
compatibility constraints are
wHH = (2− q)A+ c, wHL = (1− q)A+ c, wF = 0.
ME: Recall that with ME the principal fires the agent after he exerted low
effort and was detected, or after observing BL when eH , {eHC} is induced in
the first period. The principal maximizes
−q[qwHH + (1− q)wHL]− (1− q)[qwHL + (1− q)wLL].
The incentives of the honest agent are ensured by
qwHH + (1− q)wHL − c ≥ wHL,
qwHL + (1− q)wLL − c ≥ wLL,
q2wHH + 2q(1− q)wHL + (1− q)2wLL − 2c ≥ δewF + (1− δe)(qwHL + (1− q)wLL − c).
The incentives of the opportunist are ensured by
qwHH + (1− q)wHL − c ≥ wHL,
qwHL + (1− q)wLL − c ≥ wLL,
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qwHH + (1− q)wHL − c ≥ wHL + qA− c,
qwHL + (1− q)wLL − c ≥ wLL + qA− c,
q2wHH + 2q(1− q)wHL + (1− q)2wLL − 2c ≥ wF + qA− c,
q2wHH + 2q(1− q)wHL + (1− q)2wLL − 2c ≥ δewF + (1− δe)(qwHL + (1− q)wLL − c).
The agent’s (ex-ante) participation constraint is
q2wHH + 2q(1− q)wHL + (1− q)2wLL − 2c ≥ 0.
The participation constraint does not depend on probability p as both
types are induced the same strategy profile. It is easy to show that given the
incentive-compatibility and non-negativity constraints on wages, the agents’
participation constraint holds as well.
The optimal wages satisfying the incentive-compatibility constraints are
wHH = 2A,wHL = A,wLL = 0, wF = 0.
As qA > c, it is easy to show that wages with NM are lower than wages
with ME. Also, the ex-ante expected wage cost to the principal is lower with
NM. Thus, it is more expensive for the principal to induce the same strategy
profile with ME than with NM.
Proof of Proposition 4. a) First, I will show that if the principal offers
NM wages but introduces Monitoring of Effort the opportunist’s incentives
to be non-corrupt are weakened.
Assume that the principal offers NM wages wHH = (2− q)A + c, wHL =
(1− q)A+ c, and wLL = wF = 0.
a) If the principal introduces ME, the opportunist’s expected payoffs from
all possible strategy profiles will be as in Table 1.6.
strategy profile expected 2-period payoff expected 2-period payoff with
NM wages
{eHNC, eHNC} q2wHH + 2q(1− q)wHL + (1− q)2wLL − 2c (q2 − 2q + 2)(qA− c)
{eHNC, eHC} qwHL + (1− q)wLL + qA− 2c (2− q)(qA− c)
{eHNC, eLNC} qwHL + (1− q)wLL − c (1− q)(qA− c)
{eLNC, eHNC} δewF + (1− δe)(qwHL + (1− q)wLL − c) (1− δe)(1− q)(qA− c)
{eLNC, eHC} δewF + (1− δe)(wLL + qA− c) (1− δe)(qA− c)
{eLNC, eLNC} δewF + (1− δe)wLL 0
{eHC,−−} wF + qA− c qA− c
Table 1.6: The opportunist’s expected wages for all possible strategy profiles when ME is
introduced with NM wages.
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It is easy to show that (as 0 < q < 1, 0 < δe < 1, c > 0, A > 0, and qA > c)
the opportunist will ex-ante prefer the strategy profile {eHNC, eHC}. The
strategy space of the honest type is a subset of the strategy space of the
opportunist. For the honest type only those strategy profiles that do not
involve corruption are relevant. It is easy to check that the incentives of
the honest type are not affected - he will still prefer the strategy profile
{eHNC, eHNC}.
Now, we also need to check the ex-post incentives of the agent who is
standing at the beginning of the second period. Table 1.7 summarizes the
expected (two-period) payoffs contingent on the first-period outcome and on
the results of monitoring.20
1st-period strategy
& outcome
2nd-period
strategy
expected 2-period payoff expected 2-period payoff
with NM wages
eH eHNC qwHL + (1− q)wLL − c (1− q)(qA− c)
NOT lucky ⇒ BL eHC wLL + (qA− c) (qA− c)
(or eL) eL wLL 0
eH eHNC qwHH + (1− q)wHL − c A
lucky ⇒ BH eHC wHL + (qA− c) A
non-corrupt eL wHL A− (qA− c)
Table 1.7: The opportunist’s expected wages for all possible strategy profiles when MC is
introduced with NM wages.
It is easy to show that the opportunist cannot be better of by not keeping
to his ex-ante chosen strategy profile. For the honest type, his strategy space
consists of the strategies that do not involve corruption. It is easy to show
that the second-period incentives of the honest type are not affected. Thus,
with ME the opportunist now prefers the strategy profile {eHNC, eHC}.
b) To prove this part of the proposition, we solve the same problem as
in the proof of Proposition 3, just with additional budget constraints of the
principal. With NM, the principal’s expected cost is q2wHH + q(1− q)wHL+
(1−q)wF , which, with optimal wages wHH = (2−q)A+c, wHL = (1−q)A+c,
and wF = 0, is equal to q(A + c). Thus, the additional budget constraint
for ME is q2wHH + 2q(1 − q)wHL + (1 − q)2wLL ≤ q(A + c). With ME and
the additional budget constraint, the strategy profile {eHNC, eHNC} is no
longer implementable.
20Recall that being corrupt in the first period, the opportunist delivers low output and
therefore is fired. Therefore, such a first-period strategy is not relevant for an agent
deciding about his second-period strategy.

Chapter 2
Testing Leniency Programs
Experimentally: The Impact
of Change in Parameterization
Abstract
I analyze subjects’ sensitivity to parametric change that does not affect the
theoretical prediction. I find that increasing the value of an illegal transac-
tion to a briber and reducing the penalties to both culprits leads to more
bribes being paid but does not affect the cooperation of the bribee. My data
also suggest that trust and preferences towards others might play a role.
This chapter provides a testbed for experimental testing of anti-corruption
measures and adds evidence to the on-going discussion on the need for socio-
demographic controls.
Keywords: corruption, anti-corruption mechanisms, optimal contract, moni-
toring
JEL classification: C91, D02, D73, K42
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2.1 Introduction
The severe consequences of corruption have been documented in numerous
empirical studies. For example, Mauro (1995) and Tanzi (1998) have shown a
negative effect of corruption on economic growth; Hwang (2002) has demon-
strated that corruption, through tax evasion, reduces government revenues;
and Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme (2002) have shown that corruption
increases income inequality and poverty. The design and implementation of
effective anti-corruption measures therefore remains an important concern.
One promising anti-corruption measure is the leniency policy. Leniency
policies award fine reductions of varying intensities to wrongdoers who“spon-
taneously” report an illegal agreement and thereby help to convict their ac-
complice(s). They serve as an enforcement mechanism as much as a means
of deterrence in that, if appropriately designed and implemented, they have
the potential to undermine the trust between wrongdoers. Leniency policies
have been analyzed in the literature mostly as an anti-cartel mechanism.
The deterrence effect of leniency policies in the case of cartels has been an-
alyzed – and confirmed – both theoretically (e.g. Spagnolo 2004) and experi-
mentally (e.g. Apesteguia, Dufwenberg and Selten 2004; Bigoni, Fridolfsson,
Le Coq and Spagnolo 2008 a,b).
Spagnolo (2004), for example, theoretically examines the effects of le-
niency policies of various degrees – from moderate (which reduce or cancel
the penalty for a criminal who reports) to full (which, in addition, pay a re-
ward). He shows that reward-paying leniency programs provide a (socially)
costless1 and very efficient measure for cartel deterrence.
Drawing on earlier versions of Spagnolo (2004), Apesteguia, Dufwenberg
and Selten (2004) conducted an experiment that confirms the promising
cartel-deterring properties of leniency policies. Bigoni, Fridolfsson, Le Coq
and Spagnolo (2008 a,b) conducted related experiments. In addition to con-
firming the basic results about the effectiveness of leniency programs, they
attempted to acquire a deeper understanding of the driving forces. In several
treatments they vary specific features of the game – fine levels, exogenous
risk of detection, reward schemes, possibility to communicate, and the eligi-
bility for leniency. They control for past convictions and for subjects’ risk
attitudes. The experiments are run in Stockholm and in Rome, which allows
1This is the case if the rewards are fully financed from fines imposed on other convicted
members of the cartel.
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assessing potential cultural effects.
Bigoni et al. (2008a) find that leniency leads to higher deterrence but
at the same time helps to sustain higher prices. Rewards lead to almost
complete deterrence – which is in line with Spagnolo’s (2004) result. Past
convictions reduce the number of cartels but increase collusive prices. The
authors, in addition, distinguish between two types of past convictions: 1)
those that occur as a result of reporting and 2) those that occur as a result
of external investigation. They find that past convictions after reporting
have a much stronger deterrence effect than past convictions after external
investigation. The results also confirm a strong cultural effect.
Bigoni et al. (2008b) focuses on the role of risk attitudes. They find
that risk aversion and the willingness to form a cartel are negatively corre-
lated. The results suggest that past experience might have more important
consequences for the perception of risk than the exogenous probability of
detection, and that the strategic risk (the risk of being cheated upon) plays
a key role for the effectiveness of a leniency policy.
Both Bigoni et al. (2008 a,b) contribute to a better understanding of the
cartel-deterring properties of leniency policies and highlight the importance
of proper policy design.
Leniency policies to deter cartels are, however, not directly applicable as
anti-corruption measures, since cartel deterrence is essentially a simultaneous
game while strategies, payoffs, and the move structure of anti-corruption
measures are asymmetric.2 A proper theoretical and experimental analysis
is therefore called for.
To my knowledge the first theoretical work analyzing the various effects
of leniency policies on corruption is Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006). The
authors show that poorly designed moderate policies may have a serious
counter-productive effect: they might allow a briber to punish at relatively
low cost a partner who does not respect an illegal agreement. In other words,
some leniency policies might actually provide an enforcement mechanism for
occasional illegal transactions.3 Thus they can, contrary to the intention,
increase corruption.
Buccirossi and Spagnolo’s result together with the theoretical and exper-
imental evidence from the literature on cartel deterrence suggests that the
potential of leniency policies to undermine trust between wrongdoers hinges
2For a more detailed discussion see Richmanova´ (2006).
3Occasional illegal transactions are essentially one-shot transactions.
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upon proper design and implementation.
Experimental methods have been widely used, albeit rarely, to study cor-
ruption (Dusˇek, Ortmann and L´ızal 2005). They become especially useful
when counterfactual institutional arrangements such as leniency programs
need to be explored: they provide, for example, relatively cheap ways to ex-
amine the effects of such arrangements in controlled environments (see Dusˇek
et al. 2005, Apesteguia et al. 2004, Buccirossi and Spagnolo 2006, Bigoni et
al. 2008 a,b, Richmanova´ and Ortmann 2008, and also Roth 2002).
In Richmanova´ and Ortmann (2008), we proposed a generalization of
the Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) model by introducing the probabilistic
discovery of evidence.4 Our generalization makes the model more realistic
and more readily applicable for experimental testing without changing the
qualitative results of Buccirossi and Spagnolo.
We use the generalized Buccirossi and Spagnolo model for the experi-
mental testing of leniency policies as an anti-corruption measure. As we ad-
dress two different methodological issues that (anti-)corruption experiments
are aﬄicted with, our results are reported in two papers: Krajcˇova´ (2008)
(also this chapter), and the closely related work reported in Krajcˇova´ and
Ortmann (2008) (also Chapter 3). Both papers provide a new testbed for
anti-corruption programs.
Altogether, we design three experimental treatments: a benchmark, which
is common for both studies, Krajcˇova´ and Ortmann (2008) and this chapter,
and in which all instructions are presented in completely neutral language;
a context treatment, in which we use the same parameterization as in the
benchmark but instructions are presented in full bribery context (Krajcˇova´
and Ortmann 2008); and a high-incentive treatment, which implements a
new parameterization within neutral framing (this chapter).5
In Krajcˇova´ and Ortmann (2008), following the earlier work of Abbink
and Hennig-Schmidt (2006), we study the effect of “loaded” instructions in a
bribery experiment. Surprisingly, Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt find no signif-
4In the original model, Buccirossi and Spagnolo assume that the briber and bribee
agree to produce hard evidence, which serves as a hostage. Without hard evidence being
produced, the occasional illegal transaction is not enforceable. An audit, if it takes place,
discovers the evidence with a probability of one. In Richmanova´ and Ortmann (2008), we
argue that instead some evidence is created unintentionally and this can be discovered by
an audit with some probability that is less than one.
5We have, in addition, designed some additional exploratory treatments which we use
for a robustness check of the main results. See the appendix for more details.
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icant impact of instructions framing. The authors conclude that this result
may be caused by the nature of the game: it is very simple, and as it was de-
signed to capture all the basic features of bribery, even with neutral wording,
subjects may have deciphered what the experiment was about. Our bribery
game includes stages where players can report their opponents and receive
leniency, which makes it more complex and also potentially more susceptible
to the non-neutral context. Therefore, it calls for a separate analysis. We
find a strong gender effect - male and female participants react differently
to the non-neutral context. The effect of context becomes significant once
we allow for gender-specific coefficients. Thus, in contrast to the results of
Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006), we find that a bribery context indeed
makes a (significant) difference.
In this chapter I study the effect of a change in parameterization. It has
been documented in the literature that a change in parameterization that
does not affect the theoretical prediction might indeed have consequences
for the behavior of subjects in the lab (see e.g. Goeree and Holt 2001).
Anti-corruption experiments might be particularly tricky, being sensitive to
changes in design. In the generalized Buccirossi and Spagnolo game, the
action bringing the highest possible payoff is also associated with a risk of
considerable loss. Therefore, risk or loss attitudes are also likely to play
a role. Altogether, I expect that subjects in the lab might not behave in
accordance with the theoretical prediction, especially when the prediction is
made under an assumption of risk neutrality.6 The question I ask is whether
by making corruption more attractive by i) increasing the potential gain and
ii) reducing the penalty if bribery is discovered, I can induce more corruption
in the lab even if the theoretical prediction suggests no change. I also study
to what extent the subjects’ decisions in the experiment can be explained by
their basic socio-demographic characteristics.
I do indeed find a significant effect of parametric change. Even though
the change I implemented has no consequences for the theoretical prediction,
I observe much more corruption in the high-incentive than in the benchmark
treatment. My data suggest that trust and preferences towards others might
play a role. The econometric analysis provides limited evidence on the role
of basic socio-demographic characteristics. I find no differences in how the
parametric change affects the behavior of male and of female participants.
6In fact, in our data we observe deviations from the theoretical prediction in all three
treatments.
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Both Chapters 2 and 3 provide a testbed for the experimental testing of anti-
corruption measures and add evidence to the on-going discussion on the need
for socio-demographic controls.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section
I discuss the generalized Buccirossi and Spagnolo model in detail, and I also
describe and compare two experimental treatments. Section 3 talks about
experimental implementation and in Section 4 I review the results. Section
5 concludes.
2.2 Experimental Design
The experiment implements the bribery game in Richmanova´ and Ortmann
(2008). An entrepreneur has an investment possibility of net present value
v, if a bureaucrat is willing to perform an illegal action, Action a. For doing
so, the bureaucrat may require compensation in the form of a bribe, b.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the entrepreneur decides
whether to Pay or Not Pay a bribe. If she does not pay a bribe, the game
ends. If she does, the bureaucrat chooses one of three possible actions: De-
nounce, do Nothing,7 or perform Action a.8
If the bureaucrat chooses Denounce, an audit is carried out. The audit
may (with probability β, β ∈ (0, 1)) or may not (with probability 1 − β)
discover some evidence of bribery. If the bribery attempt is detected, the
leniency policy guarantees that the bureaucrat will have to pay only a reduced
fine whereas the entrepreneur will have to pay the full fine. In addition, bribe
b is confiscated.9 If the bribery is not detected, the bureaucrat will enjoy bribe
b.
If the bureaucrat chooses Nothing or Action a, the entrepreneur has an-
other move. In both cases, she may choose between Denounce and do Noth-
7Nothing denotes a passive action choice. For the bureaucrat, it means that he nei-
ther denounces nor respects (by providing the favor) the illegal agreement. For the en-
trepreneur, it means that she does not denounce in response to the bureaucrat’s action.
8Action a means that the bureaucrat respects the illegal agreement and thus provides
an (illegal) favor to the entrepreneur. That is, strictly speaking, not a corrupt action
because it does not impose a negative externality on the public. According to Abbink,
Irlenbusch and Renner (2002) it is not such a problem since people do not care much about
the costs they impose on others.
9Note that in this case the illegal transaction has been detected without Action a being
performed and therefore there is no gain to the entrepreneur to be confiscated.
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ing.
If the entrepreneur chooses Denounce and the ensuing audit discovers
evidence (which, again, happens with probability β), then she will have to
pay a reduced fine whereas the bureaucrat will have to pay the full fine and,
in addition, their illegal gains will be confiscated. If no evidence is discovered,
both the bureaucrat and the entrepreneur will keep their illegal gains.
If the entrepreneur chooses Nothing, then an audit may still occur with
some nonzero probability α. If the audit detects bribery (which happens with
probability β), both parties are subject to a sanction, which consists of the
confiscation of the illegal gains plus the full fine. The illegal gains include
bribe b in any case and value v only in the case when the bureaucrat has
chosen to perform Action a.
Figure 2.1 summarizes the extensive form of the game and the expected
payoffs.
Figure 2.1: Extensive form of the corruption game in the generalized model. P stands for
Pay, NP for Not Pay, D for Denounce, N for doing Nothing, a for performing Action a, b
for bribe, v for the value of the project to the entrepreneur, α for the exogenous probability
of an audit, β for the probability of conviction, FE and FB for full fines and RFE and
RFB for reduced fines to the entrepreneur and the bureaucrat, respectively.
The contribution of the generalized model lies in the introduction of prob-
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ability β. In Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) it is assumed that, before the
illegal transaction takes place, the bureaucrat and the entrepreneur agree
on the production of hard evidence. Without hard evidence being voluntar-
ily produced by both of them the illegal transaction is not enforceable. In
essence it is assumed that both involved are holding a hostage that commits
each other to the desired outcome. It is furthermore assumed that, if an au-
dit takes place, corruption is discovered and both culprits are convicted with
a probability of one. Richmanova´ and Ortmann (2008) assume instead that
some hard evidence is created unintentionally along the way and that this ev-
idence may be discovered by an audit with probability β ∈ (0, 1). The basic
structure of both the original and the modified game is the same except that
in the original version the probability β is set to 1. The generalization makes
the model more suitable for experimental testing, as no additional stage is
needed in which subjects would have to agree on producing a hostage. In ad-
dition, the generalized model arguably resembles real-world situations more
closely.10
Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) show that in the absence of a leniency
program, occasional illegal transactions are not implementable.11 The result
carries over into the generalized model. After the introduction of a modest
leniency program,12 occasional illegal transactions are enforceable if the fol-
lowing three conditions are satisfied simultaneously. First, the no-reporting
condition for the bureaucrat: the reduced fine must be such that the bu-
reaucrat prefers performing Action a to Denouncing once the bribe has been
paid. Second, the credible-threat condition for the entrepreneur: the reduced
fine and the full fine must be set such that the entrepreneur can credibly
threaten to report if the bureaucrat does not deliver. Third, the credible-
promise condition: the entrepreneur must be able to credibly promise not to
report if the bureaucrat respects the illegal agreement.
10I realize that in such a game beliefs about the probability of detection might play an
important role. However, I believe that the introduction of beliefs would make the game
more complex than necessary for experimental testing. Instead, I view probability β as the
empirical success rate, or effectiveness, of a detection technology that is known to subjects.
11Facing the full fine even after reporting, the entrepreneur cannot credibly threaten to
report the bureaucrat in the case when he would not deliver. Therefore, the bureaucrat
would keep the bribe and not perform Action a, knowing that it is not profitable for the
entrepreneur to punish him. Consequently, the entrepreneur would not enter the illegal
agreement in the first place.
12Similar to Spagnolo (2004), “modest”means that a leniency program does not reward
for reporting, at best it cancels the fine.
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These three conditions, given the value of the project together with the
full and reduced fines, define a bribe range for which the occasional illegal
transaction is implementable. Even though these conditions are modified in
the generalized model, the qualitative result remains unaffected.
I used the generalized version of the game for experimental testing of
the theoretical prediction under two different scenarios: when the occasional
illegal transaction is implementable in equilibrium, and when it is not. Imple-
mentability is a function of the per-round endowment for the entrepreneur.
The per-round endowment exogenously defines the value of the bribe if the
entrepreneur decides to pay it.13 For each treatment I use two possible values
of the per-round endowment: a low endowment that theoretically leads to a
no-corruption equilibrium, and a high endowment that theoretically leads to
a corruption equilibrium.
I want to study whether a change in parameterization that does not affect
the theoretical prediction will have an impact on the behavior of subjects in a
lab. In a game like this, where an action bringing the highest possible payoff
is also associated with the risk of an enormous loss, it is likely that subjects
in the lab will not behave in full accordance with the theoretical prediction.
I want to see whether by making the risky choice more tempting I can induce
more transferring in the lab. I also want to see what the consequences are
for later stages of the game, particularly for denouncing. For that purpose I
ran two treatments: a benchmark and a high-incentive treatment.
Table 2.1 summarizes the parameterizations chosen for the Benchmark
treatment (B) and for the (Benchmark-)High-incentives treatment (BH).
Treatment α b v RFE RFB FE FB EL EH show-up
B 0.1 0.2 100 0 0 300 300 20 40 300
BH 0.1 0.2 200 0 0 200 200 10 30 200
Table 2.1: Experimental parameterization. α and β denote the probability of an audit
and of discovering evidence of bribery, respectively; v denotes the value of the project
to the entrepreneur; RFE and RFB denote reduced fines and FE and FB full fines to
the entrepreneur and to the bureaucrat, respectively; EL and EH denote low and high
per-round endowment, respectively; show-up stands for the show-up fee.
In the B treatment, the probabilities α and β were chosen such that
they approximately correspond to real-world exogenous probabilities of audit
13This way I reduce the cognitive demand on subjects: the only decision they have to
make is whether they want to transfer their per-round endowment or not.
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and to real-world conviction rates; at the same time they are intuitively
comprehensible for subjects. The value of the project v was chosen together
with full fines FE and FB such that the subject faces a considerable gain from
the investment but also severe punishment in the case of detection. I set
reduced fines RFE and RFB equal to zero to analyze the case of full leniency
programs which, according to Apesteguia et al. (2004), have promising anti-
cartel properties. Endowment determines the value of a bribe to (not) be
paid. The “low endowment” of 20 leads (theoretically) to no corruption,
whereas the “high endowment”of 40 leads to corruption equilibrium. Finally,
the show-up fee was set such that I eliminate the possibility of earning a
negative total from the experiment.
Figure 2.2: Expected payoffs from the corruption game in the B (benchmark) and the BH
(high-incentive) treatments, respectively. Rows in the tables correspond to Participant
X and Participant Y; columns correspond to the B and BH treatments. The theoretical
prediction is the same for both treatments, it only varies with the endowment.
In the BH treatment, in order to make the risky but high-payoff choice
more tempting, I increased the value of the project to the entrepreneur and,
at the same time, I reduced the fines both agents face in case of detection.
I keep the probabilities of detection and of conviction (thus the exogenous
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risk) unchanged. In order to keep the theoretical prediction for low- and high-
endowment periods qualitatively the same as in the benchmark treatment,
the per-round endowments were also adjusted. Finally, the show-up fee is set
such that subjects cannot end up with a negative final payoff, but there is a
chance that they will earn zero.
The extended game forms together with the expected payoffs resulting
from the parameterizations for both the B and the BH treatments are illus-
trated in Figure 2.2 for low- and for high-endowment periods. The branches
identifying the equilibrium choices of risk-neutral agents are in bold.
2.3 Implementation
The experiment was conducted in November and December 2006 at CERGE-
EI in Prague, using a mobile experimental laboratory.14
Participants were recruited from the Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles
University in Prague and from various faculties of the Czech Technical Uni-
versity in Prague. Students were approached via posters distributed on cam-
pus and via e-mail.15
I conducted four sessions of each treatment. Twelve participants, six in
the role of Participant X – the entrepreneur – and six in the role of Participant
Y – the bureaucrat – interacted in each session. In each session, all subjects
participated in six rounds during which they kept the role that was assigned
to them at the beginning of the first round.16 Participants were randomly and
anonymously re-matched after each round so that no subject was matched
twice with the same co-player. This was common knowledge. The incentive
compatibility of this matching scheme is discussed in Kamecke (1997).
14http://home.cerge-ei.cz/ortmann/BA-PEL.htm
15By email, I also directly invited students who participated earlier in unrelated exper-
iments conducted at CERGE-EI.
16After each Participant X interacted exactly once with each Participant Y, the roles
were switched for another six rounds. Subjects were not informed about the switch of
roles in advance in order to avoid a possible impact on their behavior in the first six
rounds. Before the beginning of the seventh round the announcement about the switch
of roles appeared on their screens. The decisions in the last six rounds are likely affected
by subjects’ experience from the first six rounds and therefore I do not report them in
the main text. A comparison of the before-switch and after-switch data is provided in
the appendix. For the B treatment, I observe more transferring in the after-switch data,
and also more denouncing in both the second and the third stage. In the BH treatment,
I observe less denouncing in the second stage. The rest of the results seem unaffected.
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Treatment Subject
Source17
M/F
ratio18
mean
(age)
mean
(RA score)
mean
(final pay)19
Irreg20
B FSS 8/4 20.9 29.7 320 1
B FSS 10/2 21.75 28.8 330 0
B CTU 11/1 22.9 34.7 330 0
B FSS 9/3 22.3 26.4 323.3 0
BH CTU 9/3 22.6 33 185.8 1
BH CTU 10/2 22.8 28.9 309.2 0
BH CTU 10/2 22.5 29.3 241.7 1
BH FSS 10/2 21.9 24.8 259.2 1
Table 2.2: Summary of the demographic characteristics of subjects for all eight sessions.
Table 2.2 summarizes the demographic characteristics of subjects partic-
ipating in the experiment. The majority of my subjects were male, reflecting
the composition of the subject pools that I drew on. Mean age ranges be-
tween 20.9 and 22.9; over all sessions the minimum is 18 and maximum 27.
I also measured subjects’ risk aversion using a questionnaire based on Holt
and Laury (2002). Mean RA score ranged between 24.8 and 34.7; over all
sessions the minimum is 15 and maximum 51.21 Average final payoffs for
the B treatment ranged from 320 to 330, with the minimum being 300 and
the maximum 400; for the BH treatment it ranged between 185.8 and 309.2,
17For each session, subjects were recruited from one source. FSS stands for the Faculty of
Social Sciences in Prague, CTU for the Czech Technical University in Prague. I control for
imbalance of the subject pool by including the econ and gender dummies in the econometric
analysis.
18Male/Female ratio in the session.
19This is the average final payoff after the computerized part of the experiment.
20Irreg stands for a dummy variable for session irregularities. In the first B-treatment
session an experimenter effect is possible; in the first BH-treatment session a typo in the
Z-tree program caused incorrect payoffs for the two final nodes displayed on the screens,
which was pointed out by one of the subjects only after several rounds; in the third BH-
treatment session two subjects continued communicating despite several admonitions; and
in the fourth BH-treatment session two subjects were reading a newspaper in between
making their choices. I do not believe that these irregularities would matter but wanted
to control nevertheless. After running the preliminary regressions I concluded that they
indeed did not matter.
21The higher the score the more risk averse the subject is. The maximum possible
RA score is 60 which, using the standard CRRA utility function x(1−r), approximately
corresponds to a relative risk aversion coefficient of .17. The minimum possible RA score
is 0, which approximately corresponds to a relative risk aversion coefficient of −.13. An
RA score of 23 corresponds to risk-neutrality.
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with the minimum being 022 and the maximum 400.23
Each session began with general instructions. Afterwards, subjects were
asked to fill in Risk-aversion and Demographic questionnaires, for which they
earned their show-up fee. Then the instructions to the computerized part
of the experiment were distributed. Understanding of the instructions was
tested by a brief questionnaire. The computerized part of the experiment
started only after every participant answered all testing questions correctly.24
The session concluded with a final questionnaire asking for the subject’s
feedback on the experiment.25
All instructions were read aloud by the experimenter. As a part of the
instructions subjects received a pictorial representation of the game with a
minimum use of game-theoretic terminology. Probabilistic outcomes were
presented in both probabilistic terms and frequency representation (see e.g.
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 1995, or Hertwig and Ortmann 2004). All instruc-
tions were presented in completely neutral language, with no reference to
bribery. The roles of the bureaucrat and the entrepreneur were renamed
Participant X and Participant Y, actions were labelled with neutral letters,
Pay/Not Pay a bribe was replaced with transfer/not transfer ; and no de-
tection/detection were labelled outcome A and outcome B, respectively (for
an analysis of the impact of loaded instructions see e.g. Abbink 2006 or
Krajcˇova´ and Ortmann 2008).26
The experiment was computerized using Z-tree software (Fischbacher
2007). At the beginning of each round, each participant was notified of
her/his role. Participants X also learned their current per-round endowment.
Then each pair interacted sequentially.27 Between the second and the third
22At that point 400 CZK corresponded to about 16 USD, in purchasing power up to
twice as much. Subjects were informed during recruitment that their final payoff from
the experiment might be zero, but could not be negative. The non-negativity of the final
payoff was ensured by the show-up fee.
23The difference in average payoffs in the B and in the BH treatment results from dif-
ferent parameterization as well as from different behavior of subjects as will be illustrated
later.
24This was common knowledge.
25For filling out this last questionnaire, subjects were paid an additional 50-200 CZK
(corresponds to about 2-9 USD) - the amount varied between sessions. This mechanism was
used to adjust average earnings for the session to the level promised during the recruitment.
26Originals (in Czech) of all materials that subjects received during the experiment are
available at http://home.cerge-ei.cz/richmanova/WorkInProgress.html.
27Choices were made by clicking the respective buttons on the screen. Subjects were
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stage, Participants X were asked about their choices in each node of the third
stage if they were to reach it. After they made their conditional choices, they
learned the actual decision of their co-player and they were asked to confirm,
or to change, their previous choice. This mechanism allowed me to collect
some additional data in rounds when the third stage was not reached.
At the end of each round subjects were given feedback about their ac-
tion(s), the action(s) of the player they were paired with, the realization of
the random outcome (A or B) and their resulting payoff. At the end, one
round was randomly chosen to determine the final payoff from the computer-
ized part of the experiment. This mechanism was chosen in order to ensure
that the decision in every round is made as if in a one-shot game. This
payment procedure was common knowledge ex ante.
Participants were paid anonymously in cash right after each session. I
used the Czech crown as the currency unit throughout the whole experiment.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Summary Data
In Figure 2.3, the results from low- and high-endowment periods are pre-
sented. Each figure integrates the results from both treatments – the B
treatment data in the upper rows, the BH treatment below. The equilibrium
choices for each case are in bold face.
For the aggregate first-stage data, a clear treatment effect can be observed
– the frequencies of choosing Pay are higher in the BH treatment than in
the B treatment. In both treatments, the frequencies of choosing Pay are
higher in the low-endowment periods than in the high-endowment periods,
which contradicts the theoretical prediction. Intuitively, subjects seem to be
willing to transfer their endowment in order to get a chance of receiving a
high payoff, but they are more willing to put at stake a low endowment than
a high. Instead of risking the high endowment they seem to prefer choosing
the sure outcome.
As for the second-stage data, only relative percentages can be compared
across treatments, as different numbers of subjects actually entered this stage
of the game. In both low- and high-endowment periods, the results for the
two treatments are very similar: it is about an equal split between playing
notified that once they made their choice it would not be possible to take it back.
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Figure 2.3: Experimental results. For each branch of the extensive form of the game, the
upper row always displays the frequency of the action in the B treatment; and the lower
row displays the frequency of the action in the BH treatment (both with the corresponding
percentage in parentheses). For the nodes E1 and E2, above the branches, I present the
conditional choices subjects were asked to report before they made their actual choice.
Frequencies of real choices, which depend on the preceding decision of Participant Y, are
presented at the bottom part of each figure.
Denounce or Action a. Only in low-endowment periods of the BH treatment
Action a slightly dominates. These results are not in line with the theoretical
prediction. The difference in expected payoffs resulting from Denounce and
Action a is, however, very small and that may be the reason why I do not
observe a stronger inclination to either choice. Also note that in both treat-
ments Denounce is the only action through which the bureaucrat can avoid
a negative expected round payoff with certainty.28 In line with theoretical
prediction and also intuition, Nothing was almost never chosen.
As for the third-stage data, conditional choices provide mixed evidence.
In the E1 node, both conditional and sequential choices in the BH treatment
are closer to the theoretical prediction than in the B treatment. In the E2
node, it is just the opposite: in the BH treatment both conditional and
28See Figure 2.2 and Table 2.1 for more details. Even though the subject could possibly
earn a negative round payoff, each subject also received a show-up fee that ensured a
non-negative total payoff.
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sequential29 choices move further away from the theoretical prediction.
Note that for the second and third stage data I have too few independent
observations (especially so for the B treatment and for the high-endowment
periods)30 to perform a reliable formal analysis. Therefore, I only perform a
statistical and regression analysis of the first-stage data.
2.4.2 Analysis of the First-Stage Data
In the following two subsections I report the results from the formal analysis
of the first-stage data. I conducted standard non-parametric tests identifying
differences in the distribution of choices under the two treatments. I also
computed the effect size indices to measure the magnitude of the treatment
effect. Finally, I report the results from the estimation of a linear probability
model in which I control for some demographic characteristics of subjects.
Due to the panel nature of the data, I considered four different approaches
to formal regression analysis: 1) clustered data analysis – data from periods
1, 3, and 5 (low-endowment) and from periods 2, 4, and 6 (high-endowment)
are clustered by subject to correct standard errors for likely within-subject
correlation; 2) first-period data analysis – only first-period data (for the low-
endowment case) and only second-period data (for the high-endowment case)
are analyzed; 3) averaged data analysis – averaged data for periods 1, 3, and 5
and for periods 2, 4, and 6 are analyzed; and 4) dominant-choice data analysis
– for each endowment value (low or high) each subject makes choices in three
periods, and the dominant choice is the one that is played more often.
Clustered data have the advantage of using all the available information,
while the other three approaches use only a part of the available information.
Therefore, in the main text I discuss the results for clustered data. The
analysis of averaged, first-period, and dominant-choice data can be found in
the appendix, as a robustness check of the main results. By and large, there
are no major findings in these robustness tests.
In addition to the robustness checks based on different “data handling”
I also run a few additional exploratory sessions of treatments in which the
29When I asked subjects to make their real sequential choices, only one subject in the
B treatment changed her/his decision in the E2 node from Denounce to Nothing (after
observing what Player 2 had chosen) in the low-endowment period. No one changed
her/his decision in the high-endowment period or in the BH treatment.
30Recall that Figure 2.3 presents the aggregated data from all the relevant periods,
therefore it contains repeated observations for individual subjects
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experimental conditions are only slightly modified compared to the bench-
mark and the high-incentive treatments. The results from the analysis on
the extended data set is provided in the appendix, as an additional robust-
ness check of the main results. By and large, there are no major findings in
these robustness checks. Pooling slightly different treatments leads to noisier
results, which is not very surprising.
Statistical Analysis
In Table 2.3 I report the results of three standard non-parametric tests in
order to identify the differences in the distributions of choices under the
two treatments. Specifically, I test the null hypothesis of no differences be-
tween the two treatments using the averages of the binary transfer variable31
over periods 1, 3, and 5 and 2, 4, and 6. According to Wilcoxon rank-sum,
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Fisher’s exact tests I reject the hypothesis of no
differences in the distribution of choices under two treatments at the 5%
significance level.
periods Ranksum32 Ksmirnov33 Fisher34
1,3,5 -3.632
(.000)
.500
(.002)
(.001)
2,4,6 -3.853
(.000)
.625
(.000)
(.000)
Table 2.3: Non-parametric tests.
To assess the magnitude of the effect for practical purposes, I in addition
compute two standardized measures of effect size: Cohen’s d and odds ratio,
again, using the averages of the binary transfer variable over periods 1, 3,
and 5 and 2, 4, and 6. The results for the full sample and for the male and
female subsamples are reported in Table 2.4.
Cohen (1998) defines effect sizes of d = 0.2 as small, d = 0.5 as medium,
and d = 0.8 as large. For the full sample, as well as for the male and female
subsamples, the results suggest a large effect – the transfer rates in the BH
31Transfer has a value of one if Participant X chooses Pay and a value of zero if s/he
chooses Not Pay in the respective period.
32Ranksum stands for the two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (or Mann-Whitney) test. I
report the normalized z statistic and corresponding p-value below.
33Ksmirnov stands for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. I report the statistic and below
the corresponding p-value from testing the hypothesis that average transfer is lower in the
B treatment.
34Fisher stands for Fisher’s exact test. I report the resulting p-value.
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treatment are considerably higher than in the B treatment for both male and
female subsamples.
B BH effect size
Periods Sample N mean std.dev. N mean std.dev. odds ratio Cohen’s d
1,3,5 full 24 .528 .4495 24 .944 .2123 1.788 1.1827
male 18 .519 .4461 19 .930 .2378 1.792 1.150
female 6 .556 .5018 5 1 0 1.799 1.251
2,4,6 full 24 .222 .3764 24 .681 .3330 3.068 1.2924
male 18 .296 .4105 19 .719 .3194 2.429 1.150
female 6 0 0 5 .533 .3801 NA35 1.983
Table 2.4: Effect-size indices.
Altogether, both statistical tests and effect-size measures suggest that
there are significant differences between the first-stage choices in the BH and
B treatments. In the next step I perform a further analysis in which I control
for gender and for other subject characteristics.
Econometric Analysis
During the experiment I distributed several questionnaires in order to collect
basic demographic data. Specifically, I have information about subjects’ age,
gender, university and field of study.36 I also measured each subject’s risk
aversion.
The dependent variable was defined as a 0/1 dummy variable translog
identifying Pay being chosen (value of 1) or not (value of 0) in a particular
period. I estimate a clustered linear probability model. I prefer a linear
probability model to other non-linear alternatives, as it does not rely on very
specific distributional assumptions, the violation of which leads to inconsis-
35A division-by-zero problem occurs, due to no variation in this subsample.
36In addition, I collected data on: size of subject’s household, number of cars in the
household, and whether the subject himself has his own car and what is its approximate
value, all of which serve as proxies for income. I also asked the subjects whether they
considered themselves as technical types compared to their peers. I recorded the occurrence
of any inconsistencies in the after-instructions questionnaire, which served as a simple test
of understanding of the basic structure of the game, and in the risk-aversion questionnaire.
At the end of the session I asked my subjects whether they understood the experiment.
Finally, I recorded some general information about each session – the time of day it started
and any session irregularities if they occurred. After running some preliminary regressions
I, however, conclude that none of these variables is significant for explaining subjects’
decisions. The demographic and the risk-aversion questionnaires are based on Rydval
(2007).
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tent estimates if non-linear models are employed. Another advantage of the
linear probability model lies in the straightforward interpretation of the es-
timated coefficients. I run clustered robust estimation to correct standard
errors for likely within-subject correlation and for heteroskedasticity.
In the appendix, I provide a discussion of the robustness checks I con-
ducted in addition to the clustered regression analysis. As the theoretical
prediction differs for low- and high-endowment periods,37 these two groups
were analyzed separately.
I start with a basic minimal model:38
P (translog = 1|x) = β0 + β1 · age+ β2 ·male+ β3 · econ+ β4 ·BHtreat,
where age corresponds to the subject’s reported age, male is a dummy vari-
able defined based on the subject’s reported gender, and econ is a dummy
variable identifying a subject having (value of 1) or not having (value of 0) an
economic background, which is defined based on the subject’s reported field
of study. As I am mainly interested in the treatment effect, I also include a
BH-treatment dummy BHtreat in the model.
The results from the estimation are summarized in Table 2.5.
The model is strongly significant for both low- and high-endowment pe-
riods. Importantly, also the treatment dummy is significant at any conven-
tional significance level.
The mean predicted probability of transfer in the low-endowment periods
is .7361 for the pooled sample. For the B treatment it is .5278, for the BH
treatment .9444. In the high-endowment periods, the mean predicted proba-
bility of transfer is considerably lower. For the pooled sample it is .4514, for
the B treatment .2222, and for the BH treatment .6806. Thus, as I expected,
the transfer rate is much higher in the high-incentive treatment. For both
37Recall that in periods 1, 3, and 5 the endowment was low and in periods 2, 4, and 6
the endowment was high.
38The second approach I used was P (translog = 1|x) = β0+β1 ·ra score, where ra score
is a risk aversion score computed based on data from the risk-aversion questionnaire.
Preliminary analysis suggests that age, male and econ predict ra score well (all three are
jointly significant at the 5% level, age and male with a negative sign on the coefficient, age
with a positive; my proxy for income appeared insignificant, which is reasonable given my
population sample). It was natural to consider these two sets of independent variables -
one including ra score only, and the other including male, age and income - as candidates
for minimal models for my analysis. However, in P (translog = 1|x) = β0 + β1 · ra score
ra score never appeared significant and only rarely I observed the joint significance of the
estimated models. Therefore, I omit a discussion of these results.
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periods 1,3,5 periods 2,4,6
age -.0761
(.001)
-.0452
(.053)
male .0335
(.785)
.3008
(.007)
econ -.1990
(.056)
-.0773
(.498)
BHtreat .3019
(.007)
.3972
(.001)
mean bp(y=1) .7361 .4514
# of obs. 144 144
joint p-value (.000) (.000)
Table 2.5: The results from the estimation of the linear probability model. The first row
of each cell reports the estimated coefficients. The second row reports the corresponding
p-value. Mean p̂(y=1) denotes the mean predicted probability of a transfer being made.
treatments the transfer rate is higher in low- than in high-endowment peri-
ods. This result contradicts the theoretical prediction39 (we find the same
result in the context treatment, see Krajcˇova´ and Ortmann 2008).
Age is significant at the 5% level for low-endowment periods and at the
10% level for high-endowment periods, in both cases with a negative sign on
the coefficient. An additional year of age reduces the probability of transfer
by .08 with low and by .05 with high endowment.
The male dummy is not significant for low-endowment periods, but I get
strong significance for high-endowment periods.40 In both cases, the sign on
the coefficient is positive, meaning that men are more likely to transfer – by
.03 when the endowment is low and by .30 when it is high – than women.
Econ is significant at the 10% level for low endowment and not significant
for high endowment periods. The sign on the coefficient is, in both cases,
negative. Thus, subjects with an economic background are less likely to
transfer.
The BHtreat dummy is significant at the 1% level for both low- and high-
endowment periods. The sign on the coefficient is positive meaning that, as I
expected, subjects in the high-incentive treatment are more likely to transfer
39Recall that in the equilibrium Participant X always transfers with a high endowment
and never transfers with a low.
40I find no evidence of gender-specific effects such as in Krajcˇova´ and Ortmann (2008).
In the first stage, both male and female participants transfer more in the BH treatment
than in the B treatment. I find some differences in the behavior of men and women – in the
second stage with high endowment; and for sequential choices in the E2 node with both
low and high endowment. In all three cases, however, the size of the female subsample is
too small to make any plausible inferences.
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– by .30 with low and by .40 with high endowment – than subjects in the
benchmark treatment.
In general, the main results that can be observed from the descriptive
data are also statistically significant.
2.5 Discussion
I expected that subjects in my experiment might not behave in complete
accordance with the theoretical predictions made under the assumption of
rationality and risk-neutrality. Apart from risk attitudes, phenomena such
as altruism, reciprocity (positive or negative) and/or trust might play im-
portant roles. In fact, in my data I observe considerable deviations from
equilibrium at some stages of the game. The change in parameterization
shifts some of the results closer and some further away from the predictions.
In this section, I discuss the results, and provide some explanations for these
deviations and for the observed treatment effect. I also derive implications
for experimental design and the implementation of the experimental testing
of leniency programs.
In the first stage, for both treatments, I observe higher transfer rates
in low- than in high-endowment periods, which contradicts the theoretical
prediction.41 In the BH treatment the fraction of out-of-equilibrium choices
is even higher than in the B treatment. A similar result is found for the
context treatment in Krajcˇova´ and Ortmann (2008).
I note that the theoretical prediction is computed under the assumption
of risk neutrality, which, as also suggested by the data from the risk-aversion
questionnaire, is not likely to hold in my sample. My subjects appear to be
modestly risk-averse, in accordance with the typical finding in the experimen-
tal literature (e.g. Holt and Laury 2002, Harrison, Johnson, McInnes, and
Rutstro¨m 2005). When I computed the theoretical prediction for a (mod-
estly) risk averse subject, I found that under some (reasonable) assumptions,
my chosen parameterization can lead to a no-corruption equilibrium also for
the high-endowment periods.42 That is, for risk-averse subjects, it might in
41Recall that in the equilibrium Participant X always transfers with a high endowment
and never transfers with a low. Or, in other words, given the leniency program currently
in force, theoretically, with a low endowment (thus, a low bribe) an occasional illegal
transaction is not implementable.
42I assume a standard CRRA utility function u(x) = x(1−r). The average risk-aversion
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fact be optimal not to transfer a high endowment.
In addition, my subjects might exhibit the “preference for inclusion” re-
ported by Cooper and Van Huyck (2003). The authors find that subjects
presented with an extensive form game are significantly more likely to make
choices that allow their co-player to make a choice – and thereby to affect final
payoffs – rather than choosing a terminal node. In an extensive form game
this “(non)inclusion” is more salient. In my game, “inclusion” introduces a
risk of significant loss. Together with risk- or loss-avoidance, it might have
resulted in subjects with a “preference for inclusion” being willing to transfer
and continue playing the game, but only being ready to risk the low endow-
ment and preferring to keep the high endowment for sure.
Furthermore, note that the difference in expected payoffs to Participant Y
from choosing Denounce or Action a is relatively small43 in both treatments
(assuming that Participant X will react rationally), whereas the difference in
payoffs to Participant X is substantial. Therefore, an altruistic Participant
Y might prefer choosing Action a even in low-endowment periods, when this
action is not maximizing the expected payoff. Or, alternatively, choosing
Action a might be an act of positive reciprocity. In low-endowment periods,
a rational Participant X might expect a rational Participant Y to choose
Denounce and therefore he would not transfer. A Participant X who is
trusting might expect Participant Y to choose Action a in the second stage
and therefore he might want to transfer.
In the BH treatment, the difference in expected payoffs to Participant Y
is about the same, but the possible gain to Participant X (after Action a has
coefficient in my sample is about 0.03; the maximal is about 0.1. As the bribery game
involves nodes with negative payoffs, some assumptions need to be made about the utility
function in the negative domain. Prospect theory suggests that in the negative domain, the
steepness of the utility function might be about twice as much as in the positive domain.
For illustration, I computed the theoretical prediction for a risk-neutral subject in the
B treatment assuming two different levels of (dis)utility from paying a 300 CZK penalty
after detection: u(−300) = −u(450) and u(−300) = −u(600). For low endowment, the
theoretical prediction is the same as for a risk-neutral subject. For high endowment it
changes. For an extremely risk-averse participant (r = 0.1), the disutility of 450 still
predicts a corruption equilibrium, however, the disutility of 600 predicts a no-corruption
equilibrium. For an average risk-aversion coefficient (r = 0.03), the disutility of 450 is
sufficient to change the theoretical prediction. I obtained analogical results for the BH
treatment (because of a different parameterization, the relevant disutilities for the BH
treatment are u(−200) = −u(300); and u(−200) = −u(400)).
43Note that this results from the nature of the game (see Figure 2.1).
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been chosen) is considerably larger than in the B treatment. That is why, if
the above arguments hold, the new paramererization might shift the choices
even further away from the equilibrium. This is indeed what I observe in the
data.
In the second stage, for both treatments, I observe about an equal split
between choosing Denounce and Action a, for both low- and high-endowment
periods. Nothing is almost never chosen.
Payoffs for Participant Y resulting from Nothing and Action a are the
same, but taking into account the likely decisions of Participant X in the
following stage, he is more likely to collect a higher payoff after he chooses
Action a. This seems to be correctly recognized by the vast majority of my
subjects. As regards the relative indecisiveness of subjects between choosing
Denounce or Action a, I repeat the arguments mentioned above – the dif-
ference in expected payoffs is relatively small, which together with different
preferences for altruism and reciprocity might have produced these results.
In the E1 node, a new parameterization shifts the results closer to the
prediction. Intuitively, if subjects exhibit negative reciprocity, this becomes
the more salient the more there is at stake.
In the E2 node, the majority of subjects plays equilibrium in both treat-
ments. In the BH treatment the fraction of subjects who play equilibrium is
slightly smaller. It is still the majority, though.
Altogether, my data to some extent confirm the main result of Buccirossi
and Spagnolo (2006) – an occasional illegal transaction is implementable
with a leniency policy in place. This becomes especially visible in the high-
incentive treatment with high endowment. I observe a sensitive reaction
to a parametric change that does not affect the theoretical prediction. My
finding suggests that calibration, i.e. parameterization that reflects “real-
life” situations reasonably well, might even be more important than in other
scenarios. My data also suggest that other factors might be important as
well. Trust and preferences towards others might play an important role.
Further experimental testing of leniency policies might have to take these
findings into account.
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APPENDIX
Comparing the Data from Periods Before and After the Switch of
Roles.
In Figure 2.4, I present the data from the before- and after-the-switch-
of-roles periods (before-switch data in the upper rows and after-switch data
below) from the low- and high-endowment periods of the B treatment.
In both cases, I observe a somewhat higher transfer rate in the second six
periods. The transfer rate is higher in the low-endowment periods than in
the high, before and after the switch of roles. In the B0 node, more subjects
chose the safe option (with no possibility of loss) after the switch of roles.
In the E2 node, results from before- and after-switch data are very similar,
which is not the case of the E1 node, where the relative percentages shifted
closer to the equilibrium prediction.
Figure 2.4: Before- vs. after-the-switch-of-roles data in the B treatment. Before-switch
data are in the upper rows and after-switch data are below.
In Figure 2.5, I present the data from the before- and after-switch-of-roles
periods (before-switch data in the upper row and after-switch data below)
from the low- and high-endowment periods of the BH treatment.
In both cases, I observe no differences in the transfer rates after the switch
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Figure 2.5: Before- vs. after-the-switch-of-roles data in the BH treatment. Before-switch
data are in the upper rows and after-switch data are below.
of roles. Similarly as in the first part, the transfer rate is higher in the low-
endowment periods than in the high after roles are switched. In the B0 node,
less subjects chose the safe option (with no possibility of loss) after the switch
of roles in both low- and high-endowment periods. In the E1 and E2 nodes,
results from before- and after-switch data are very similar. This is somewhat
different evidence than that from the B treatment.
Robustness Checks
I performed two types of robustness check of my estimation results. The
first regards the way I treated individual observations over rounds when run-
ning regressions – this is discussed in the subsection Handling of the Data.
The second regards the experimental design – I run several sessions of al-
ternative treatments in which I introduce only minor changes that do not
appear to significantly affect behavior of subjects – this is discussed in the
subsection Pooling the Sessions.
A. Handling of the Data
Throughout the analysis I have defined three alternative dependent vari-
ables, each of which captures slightly different information about the first-
stage data. Translog is a 0/1 dummy variable identifying a transfer being
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made (value of 1) or not (value of 0) in a particular period. Atranslog is
the average value of translog for one individual over periods 1, 3, and 5 (
low-endowment periods) or 2, 4, and 6 (high-endowment periods). Ltranslog
defines the dominant choice of a subject in periods 1, 3, and 5 or 2, 4, and 6.
For a subject who has chosen Pay two or three times out of a total of three
periods of interest, the dominant choice is 1; for a subject who has chosen
Not Pay two or three times out of a total of three periods of interest, the
dominant choice is 0.
Then, using one of the three types of dependent variable, I conducted
four different types of regression analysis.
Clustered Regressions – as discussed in the main text, I run a clustered (ro-
bust)44 linear probability model estimation with the binary variable translog
as a dependent variable.
Regressions on Averaged Data – in this case, I run an ordinary least
squares estimation of atranslog. I analyze only averaged data, where higher
values of atranslog correspond to more transfers being made and thus to a
stronger preference for this choice.45
Regressions on the 1st or 2nd Period Data – I estimate LPM only on the 1st
and 2nd period translog (for low- and high-endowment periods, respectively).
In this approach I omit part of the information, however I only use the part
of the data that is not affected by the experience from previous rounds.46
Regressions on Dominant Choice – I estimate LPM using ltranslog as a
dependent variable. Thus in this case, I am only looking at the dominant
choice of each subject.
First I look at effect size measures, whether they give robust results for
all four approaches to the data. The results are summarized in Table 2.6.
In all cases, the effects are large (recall that Cohen 1998 defines effect
sizes of d = 0.8 as large). The directions of the effects are the same in all
cases – transferring is higher in the high-incentive (BH) treatment.
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 summarize the main results from the estimation for
low- and high-endowment periods, respectively.
Under all four approaches, the treatment effect is robust – I find the
44Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and for within-subject correlation.
45I also run poisson regressions on a count variable (counting the number of transfers
made by an individual in the relevant three periods). The qualitative results are the same
as with OLS and atranslog.
46I realize that for 2nd period data this may not be completely true if subjects fail to
realize that it is a different game they are playing in the high-endowment periods.
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B BH effect size
Data mean std.dev. mean std.dev. odds ratio Cohen’s d
1,3,5 1st-period .583 .5036 .917 .2823 1.730 .8179
average .528 .4495 .944 .2123 1.788 1.1827
dominant .5 .5108 .958 .2041 1.916 1.1772
all periods .528 .5027 .944 .2306 1.788 1.0629
2,4,6 2nd-period .292 .4643 .708 .4643 2.425 1.1118
average .222 .3764 .681 .3330 3.068 1.2924
dominant .25 .4423 .708 .4643 2.832 1.0107
all periods .222 .4187 .681 .4695 3.068 1.0309
Table 2.6: Effect-size indices.
Periods 1,3,5
clustered averaged 1st-period dominant
age -.0761
(.001)
-.0761
(.002)
-.0751
(.023)
-.0720
(.006)
male .0335
(.785)
.0335
(.791)
.1024
(.465)
.0526
(706)
econ -.1990
(.056)
-.1990
(.064)
-.1349
(.298)
-.2221
(.079)
BHtreat .3019
(.007)
.3019
(.009)
.2453
(.072)
.3334
(.014)
const 2.3445
(.000)
2.3445
(.000)
2.2788
(.004)
2.2284
(.001)
mean bp(y=1) .7361 .7361 .75 .7292
# of obs. 144 48 48 48
joint p-value .000 .000 .006 .000
Table 2.7: Results from clustered regressions vs. regressions on averaged, 1st-period, and
dominant-choice data from low-endowment periods.
Periods 2,4,6
clustered averaged 2nd-
period
dominant
age -.0452
(.053)
-.0452
(.061)
-.0454
(.166)
-.0449
(.158)
male .3008
(.007)
.3008
(.009)
.1888
(.243)
.3011
(.044)
econ -.0773
(.498)
-.0773
(.511)
-.2425
(.138)
-.0448
(.785)
BHtreat .3972
(.001)
.3972
(.002)
.2844
(.083)
.4122
(.015)
const 1.0597
(.046)
1.0597
(.046)
1.3414
(.067)
1.0561
(.139)
mean bp(y=1) .4514 .4514 .5 .4792
# of obs. 144 48 48 48
joint p-value .000 .000 .003 .000
Table 2.8: Results from clustered regressions vs. regressions on averaged, 1st-period, and
dominant-choice data from high-endowment periods.
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treatment dummy BHtreat significant. Except for the 1st- and 2nd-period
data, it is significant at the 5% level. The sign on the coefficient is positive
in all cases and for both low- and high-endowment periods, meaning that the
transfer rate is higher in the high-incentive treatment.
As regards other explanatory variables, the results for low-endowment pe-
riods are very similar to results from clustered regressions – age is significant
at 5%, male is not significant, and econ is significant only at the 10% level
and not significant for the 1st-period data.
For high-endowment periods, the the results are not as robust. Age is
significant at the 10% level for clustered and averaged data, and not signifi-
cant for the 2nd-period and dominant-choice data. Male is significant at the
5% level with the exception of the 2nd-period data where it is not significant.
Econ is never significant. The results suggest that there is larger variation
in high-endowment data, which is more difficult to explain by the explana-
tory variables. I believe that a larger sample size would lead to more robust
results.
As regards the sizes and signs of coefficients, the results are very robust,
especially for clustered, averaged and dominant choice data.
B. Pooling the Sessions
In addition to the benchmark treatment B and to the high-incentive treat-
ment BH, I conducted two plus two sessions of “automatic” treatments A and
AI. Under both treatments, A and AI, I used the same game and same param-
eterization as in the B treatment. The only difference was that in automatic
treatments, each subject played against a computer program, with six sub-
jects in the role of Participant X and six subjects in the role of Participant Y.
The computer program always played a (subgame perfect) optimal strategy.
Subjects were acquainted with these facts in the instructions.
The only difference between the A and AI treatments was that in the AI
subjects received, as a separate part of the instructions, a so-called Back-
wards Induction Tutorial, intended to explain the basic principles of using
backwards induction.
Before pooling the data from different treatments I performed basic sta-
tistical tests in order to discover significant differences in the distributions of
choices – Fisher’s Exact test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test. I find no evidence
of significant differences in the distributions of choices between the A, AI and
B treatments.
Afterwards, I performed two types of pooled analysis: 1) pooling the data
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from the A and B treatments vs. the BH treatment and 2) pooling the data
from the A, AI and B treatments vs. the BH treatment. My main result,
the significance of treatment dummy at 5%, remains unaffected.
Periods 1,3,5 Periods 2,4,6
B vs. BH B,A vs. BH B,A,AI vs. BH B vs. BH B,A vs. BH B,A,AI vs. BH
age -.0761
(.001)
-.0652
(.007)
-.0376
(.160)
-.0452
(.053)
-.0229
(.338)
-.0186
(.418)
male .0335
(.785)
-.0097
(.932)
-.0178
(.863)
.3008
(.007)
.1726
(.128)
.1079
(.317)
econ -.1990
(.056)
-.2152
(.026)
-.1572
(.117)
-.0773
(.498)
-.1638
(.127)
-.1365
(.164)
BHtreat .3019
(.007)
.2898
(.001)
.3550
(.000)
.3972
(.001)
.2949
(.007)
.2831
(.006)
const 2.3445
(.000)
2.1577
(.000)
1.4756
(.016)
1.0597
(.046)
.7994
(.133)
.7613
(.130)
mean bp(y=1) .7361 .7111 .6806 .4514 .4556 .4491
# of obs. 144 180 216 144 180 216
joint p-value .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .002
Table 2.9: Results from the estimation of basic vs. extended data sets.
See Table 2.9 for the regression results for the low- and high-endowment
periods. Clearly, pooling slightly different treatments leads to noisier results,
which is not very surprising. Importantly, the treatment dummy remains
significant at the 5% level.
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We study the effects of loaded instructions in a bribery experiment. We
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Keywords: corruption, anti-corruption mechanisms, optimal contract, moni-
toring
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3.1 Introduction
The severe consequences of corruption have been widely documented in the
empirical literature. For example, Mauro (1995) and Tanzi (1998) have shown
a negative effect of corruption on economic growth; Hwang (2002) has demon-
strated that corruption, through tax evasion, reduces government revenues;
and Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme (2002) conclude that corruption in-
creases income inequality and poverty. The design and implementation of
effective anti-corruption measures therefore remains an important concern.
One promising anti-corruption measure is the leniency policy. Leniency
policies award fine reductions of varying intensities to wrongdoers who“spon-
taneously” report an illegal agreement and thereby help to convict their ac-
complice(s). They serve as an enforcement mechanism as much as a means
of deterrence in that, if appropriately designed and implemented, they have
the potential to undermine the trust between wrongdoers. Leniency policies
have been analyzed in the literature mostly as an anti-cartel mechanism.
Spagnolo (2004), for example, theoretically examines the effects of le-
niency policies of various degrees – from moderate (which reduce or cancel
the penalty for a criminal who reports) to full (which, in addition, pay a re-
ward). He shows that reward-paying leniency programs provide a (socially)
costless1 and very efficient measure for cartel deterrence. Drawing on earlier
versions of Spagnolo (2004), Apesteguia, Dufwenberg and Selten (2004) con-
ducted an experiment that confirms the promising cartel-deterring properties
of leniency policies.
Bigoni, Fridolfsson, Le Coq and Spagnolo (2008 a,b) conducted related
experiments. They find that without leniency past convictions reduce the
number of cartels but increase collusive prices. Their results also suggest
that past experience might have more important consequences for the per-
ception of risk than an exogenous probability of detection, and that strategic
risk plays a key role in the effectiveness of a leniency policy. In general,
the deterrence is higher with leniency in place and rewards lead to almost
complete deterrence.
The work of Bigoni et al. (2008 a,b) contributes to a better understand-
ing of the cartel-deterring properties of leniency policies and highlights the
importance of proper policy design.
1This is the case if the rewards are fully financed from fines imposed on other convicted
members of the gang.
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Leniency policies to deter cartels are not directly applicable as anti-
corruption measures, since cartel deterrence is a simultaneous game while
strategies, payoffs, and the move structure of anti-corruption measures are
asymmetric.2 A proper theoretical and experimental analysis is therefore
called for.
To our knowledge the first theoretical work analyzing the various effects
of leniency policies on corruption is Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006). The
authors show that poorly designed moderate policies may have a serious
counter-productive effect: they might allow a briber to punish at relatively
low cost a partner who does not respect an illegal agreement. In other words,
some leniency policies might actually provide an enforcement mechanism for
occasional illegal transactions.3 Thus they can, contrary to the intention,
increase corruption.
Buccirossi and Spagnolo’s result together with the theoretical and exper-
imental evidence from the literature on cartel deterrence suggests that the
potential of leniency policies to undermine trust between wrongdoers hinges
upon proper design and implementation.
Experimental methods have been widely used, albeit rarely, to study cor-
ruption (Dusˇek, Ortmann and L´ızal 2005). They become especially useful
when counterfactual institutional arrangements such as leniency programs
need to be explored: they provide, for example, relatively cheap ways to ex-
amine the effects of such arrangements in controlled environments (see Dusˇek
et al. 2005, Apesteguia et al. 2004, Buccirossi and Spagnolo 2006, Bigoni et
al. 2008 a,b, Richmanova´ and Ortmann 2008 and also Roth 2002).
In Richmanova´ and Ortmann (2008) we proposed a generalization of the
Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) model in which we introduce the probabilistic
discovery of evidence by auditing inspectors.4 Our generalization makes the
model more realistic and more readily applicable for experimental testing
without changing the qualitative results of Buccirossi and Spagnolo.
We use the generalized Buccirossi and Spagnolo model for the experimen-
2For a more detailed discussion see Richmanova´ (2006).
3Occasional illegal transactions are essentially one-shot transactions.
4In the original model, Buccirossi and Spagnolo assume that a briber and a bribee
agree to produce hard evidence, which serves as a hostage. Without hard evidence being
produced, the occasional illegal transaction is not enforceable. An audit, if it takes place,
discovers the evidence with a probability of one. In Richmanova´ and Ortmann (2008), we
argue that instead some evidence is created unintentionally and this can be discovered by
the audit with some probability that is less than one.
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tal testing of leniency policies as an anti-corruption measure. This chapter,
and the closely related work reported in Krajcˇova´ (2008) (in Chapter 2),
provide a new testbed for anti-corruption programs and address important
methodological issues with which (anti-)corruption experiments are aﬄicted.
Specifically, we are interested in to what extent home-grown priors that are
related to corruption might translate into moral scruples and, for example,
might induce subjects to make different decisions when loaded instructions
are used that make it unambiguously clear what the context of the experi-
ment is.5
Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006) is the study most closely related to
this chapter. In a bribery setting, these authors used a between-subject
design with one treatment providing instructions framed in neutral terms
and the other treatment “loading” the instructions with real-world framing.
The authors used a finitely repeated reciprocity game as the bribery setting.
With a very low probability (0.3%) bribery would be detected leading to both
parties involved in the transaction being excluded from the experiment and
forfeiting their accumulated earnings. In addition, a completed transaction
imposed a negative externality on the public, in Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt
(2006) represented by the other subjects in the session.
The authors find a treatment effect which is, however, not statistically
significant;6 they argue that this result may be caused by the nature of the
5Altogether, we designed three treatments: a benchmark, which is common to both
studies (this chapter and Krajcˇova´ 2008) and in which all instructions are presented in
neutral language; a context treatment, in which we use the same parameterization as in
the benchmark but instructions are presented in real-world framing (this chapter); and, fi-
nally, a high-incentive treatment, which implements a new parameterization within neutral
framing (Krajcˇova´ 2008). Krajcˇova´ (2008) examines the effect of a change in parameter-
ization. It has been documented in the literature that a change in parameterization that
does not affect the theoretical prediction might indeed have consequences for the behavior
of subjects in the lab (e.g. Goeree and Holt 2001). In the generalized Buccirossi and
Spagnolo game, the action bringing the highest possible payoff is also associated with a
risk of a considerable loss. Therefore, it is possible that subjects in the lab will not behave
in accordance with the theoretical predictions, especially when the predictions are made
under the assumption of risk neutrality. Krajcˇova´ (2008) indeed finds a significant effect
of the parametric change.
6This result is questionable. When looking at the evolutions of bribe offers and of
permission frequencies, especially in the 20 central rounds, a clear difference between the
two treatments is visible: for each round the average bribe offer is higher with neutral
than with loaded instructions. The first rounds might likely be affected by a learning
effect of the first kind (e.g., subjects becoming familiar with the lab setting rather than
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game: it is very simple, and thus, even with neutral wording, subjects may
have deciphered that the experiment was about corruption and corruptibi-
lity. The generalized Buccirossi and Spagnolo game is more complex (e.g.,
it involves the realization of two random outcomes) and therefore is likely
to be less susceptible to inferences about the true nature of the strategic
interactions.
Our results confirm that loading the instructions with real-world framing
might affect subjects’ behavior in a significant manner. Moreover, we find a
strong gender effect - male and female participants react to a bribery con-
text differently. This treatment effect becomes significant once we allow for
gender-specific effects.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section,
we discuss the generalized Buccirossi and Spagnolo model in detail, and we
also describe and compare our two experimental treatments. In Section 3 we
explain how we implemented our two treatments and in Section 4 we discuss
our results. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Experimental Design
The experiment implements the bribery game in Richmanova´ and Ortmann
(2008). An entrepreneur has an investment possibility of net present value
v, if a bureaucrat is willing to perform an illegal action, Action a. For doing
so, the bureaucrat may require compensation in the form of a bribe, b.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the entrepreneur decides
whether to Pay or Not Pay a bribe. If she does not pay a bribe, the game
ends. If she does, the bureaucrat chooses one of three possible actions: De-
nounce, do Nothing,7 or perform Action a.8
reacting to incentives, see e.g. Hertwig and Ortmann 2001) and the last five rounds by a
possible termination effect, which is acknowledged by the authors. This treatment effect is
confirmed by both the Wilcoxon rank-sum test and effect sizes for the 20 central rounds.
It would likely become significant, even without excluding the possibly problematic first
and last five periods, with a larger number of observations.
7Nothing denotes a passive action choice. For the bureaucrat, it means that he nei-
ther denounces nor respects (by providing the favor) the illegal agreement. For the en-
trepreneur, it means that she does not denounce in response to the bureaucrat’s action.
8Action a means that the bureaucrat respects the illegal agreement and thus provides a
(illegal) favor to the entrepreneur. That is, strictly speaking, not a corrupt action because
it does not impose a negative externality on the public. According to Abbink, Irlenbusch
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If the bureaucrat chooses Denounce, an audit is carried out. The audit
may (with probability β, β ∈ (0, 1)), or may not (with probability 1 − β),
discover some evidence of bribery. If the bribery attempt is detected, the
leniency policy guarantees that the bureaucrat will have to pay only a reduced
fine whereas the entrepreneur will have to pay the full fine. In addition, bribe
b is confiscated.9 If the bribery is not detected, the bureaucrat will enjoy bribe
b.
If the bureaucrat chooses Nothing or Action a, the entrepreneur has an-
other move. In both cases, she may choose between Denounce and do Noth-
ing.
If the entrepreneur chooses Denounce and the ensuing audit discovers
evidence (which, again, happens with probability β), then she will have to
pay a reduced fine whereas the bureaucrat will have to pay the full fine and,
in addition, their illegal gains will be confiscated. If no evidence is discovered,
both the bureaucrat and the entrepreneur will keep their illegal gains.
If the entrepreneur chooses Nothing, then an audit may still occur with
some nonzero probability α. If the audit detects bribery (which happens with
probability β), both parties are subject to a sanction, which consists of the
confiscation of the illegal gains plus the full fine. The illegal gains include
bribe b in any case and value v only in the case when the bureaucrat has
chosen to perform Action a.
Figure 3.1 summarizes the extensive form of the game and the expected
payoffs.
The contribution of the generalized model lies in the introduction of prob-
ability β. In Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) it is assumed that, before the
illegal transaction takes place, the bureaucrat and the entrepreneur agree
on the production of hard evidence. Without hard evidence being voluntar-
ily produced by both of them the illegal transaction is not enforceable. In
essence it is assumed that both involved are holding a hostage that commits
each other to the desired outcome. It is furthermore assumed that, if an au-
dit takes place, corruption is discovered and both culprits are convicted with
a probability of one. Richmanova´ and Ortmann (2008) assume instead that
some hard evidence is created unintentionally along the way and that this ev-
idence may be discovered by an audit with probability β ∈ (0, 1). The basic
and Renner (2002) it is not such a problem since people do not care much about the costs
they impose on others.
9Note that in this case the illegal transaction has been detected without Action a being
performed and therefore there is no gain to the entrepreneur to be confiscated.
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Figure 3.1: Extensive form of the corruption game in the generalized model. P stands
for Pay, NP for Not Pay, D for Denounce, N for doing Nothing, a for performing Action
a, b for a bribe, v for the value of the project to the entrepreneur, α for the exogenous
probability of an audit, β for the probability of conviction, FE and FB for full fines and
RFE and RFB for reduced fines to the entrepreneur and the bureaucrat, respectively.
structure of both the original and the modified game is the same except that
in the original version the probability β is set to 1. The generalization makes
the model more suitable for experimental testing, as no additional stage is
needed in which subjects would have to agree on producing a hostage. In ad-
dition, the generalized model arguably resembles real-world situations more
closely.10
Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) show that in the absence of a leniency
program, occasional illegal transactions are not implementable.11 The result
10We realize that in such a game beliefs about the probability of detection might play
an important role. However, we believe that the introduction of beliefs would make the
game more complex than necessary for experimental testing. Instead, we view probability
β as an empirical success rate, or effectiveness, of a detection technology that is known to
subjects.
11Facing the full fine even after reporting, the entrepreneur cannot credibly threaten to
report the bureaucrat in the case when he would not deliver. Therefore, the bureaucrat
would keep the bribe and not perform Action a, knowing that it is not profitable for the
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carries over into the generalized model. After the introduction of a modest
leniency program,12 occasional illegal transactions are enforceable if the fol-
lowing three conditions are satisfied simultaneously. First, the no-reporting
condition for the bureaucrat: the reduced fine must be such that the bu-
reaucrat prefers performing Action a to Denouncing once the bribe has been
paid. Second, the credible-threat condition for the entrepreneur: the reduced
fine and the full fine must be set such that the entrepreneur can credibly
threaten to report if the bureaucrat does not deliver. Third, the credible-
promise condition: the entrepreneur must be able to credibly promise not to
report if the bureaucrat respects the illegal agreement.
These three conditions, given the value of the project together with the
full and reduced fines, define a bribe range for which the occasional illegal
transaction is implementable. Even though these conditions are modified in
the generalized model, the qualitative result remains unaffected.
We used the generalized version of the game for experimental testing of
the theoretical prediction under two different scenarios: when the occasional
illegal transaction is implementable in equilibrium, and when it is not. Imple-
mentability is a function of the per-round endowment for the entrepreneur.
The per-round endowment exogenously defines the value of the bribe if the
entrepreneur decides to pay it.13 For each treatment we use two possible val-
ues of the per-round endowment: a low endowment that theoretically leads to
a no-corruption equilibrium, and a high endowment that theoretically leads
to a corruption equilibrium.
Following Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006), the focus of this chapter is
the question whether loaded instructions in a bribery experiment affect the
behavior of subjects in a lab. For that purpose, we designed two treatments:
a Benchmark (B) and a Context (C) treatment.14
entrepreneur to punish him. Consequently, the entrepreneur would not enter the illegal
agreement in the first place.
12Similarly to Spagnolo (2004), “modest”means that a leniency program does not reward
for reporting, at best it cancels the fine.
13This way we reduce the cognitive demand on subjects: the only decision they have to
make is whether they want to transfer their per-round endowment or not.
14We also conducted two exploratory sessions of a partial context treatment (C- treat-
ment), where we only provided context on the types of roles. In this treatment Participant
X was called “Entrepreneur” and Participant Y “Bureaucrat”. All actions and realizations
of random outcomes were denoted by neutral letters, as in the B treatment. We do not
report these data in the main text as it is not possible to control for subjects’ interpreta-
tion of the game in this case and therefore it is hard to recognize all the possible effects
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Table 3.1 summarizes the parameterization chosen for both treatments.
Treatment α β v RFE RFB FE FB EL EH show-up
B and C 0.1 0.2 100 0 0 300 300 20 40 300
Table 3.1: Experimental parameterization. α and β denote the probability of an audit
and of discovering evidence of bribery, respectively; v denotes the value of the project to
the entrepreneur; RFE and RFB denote reduced fines and FE and FB full fines to the
entrepreneur and to the bureaucrat, respectively; EL and EH are low and high per-round
endowment, respectively; and show-up stands for the show-up fee.
The probabilities α and β were chosen such that they approximately corre-
spond to the real world exogenous probabilities of an audit and to real-world
conviction rates; at the same time they are intuitively comprehensible for
subjects. The value of the project v was chosen together with the full fines
FE and FB such that the subject faces a considerable gain from the invest-
ment but also severe punishment in the case of detection. We set reduced
fines RFE and RFB equal to zero to analyze the case of full leniency programs
that, according to Apesteguia et al. (2004), have shown promising anti-cartel
properties. Endowment determines the value of the bribe to be (not) paid.
The “low endowment” of 20 leads (theoretically) to a no-corruption equilib-
rium, whereas the “high endowment” of 40 leads to a corruption equilibrium.
Finally, the show-up fee was set such that we eliminate the possibility of
earning a negative total from the experiment. The parameterization does
not differ between B and C treatments as we are interested purely in the
effects of “neutral” and “loaded” instructions.
Extended game forms and expected payoffs resulting from our parame-
terization are illustrated in Figure 3.2 for both low- and for high-endowment
periods. The branches identifying the equilibrium choices of risk-neutral
agents are in bold.
The instructions for the B treatment were presented in a completely
context-free fashion. Subjects were called Participant X and Participant
Y, actions were denoted by neutral letters and the realization of “detection”
or “no detection” as “outcome A” or “outcome B”, respectively.
In the C treatment, the roles that subjects were assigned were called
“Entrepreneur” and “Bureaucrat”; actions were called “Pay bribe”, “Not Pay
bribe”, “Denounce”, “do Nothing” and “Provide the favor a”; and the real-
izations of random outcomes were called “corruption has been detected” and
in this treatment. Some results from this treatment are discussed in the appendix.
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“corruption has not been detected”. Figure 3.3 provides a comparison of the
wording for the two treatments, with the neutral wording always in the upper
row.
Figure 3.2: Expected payoffs from the corruption game.
Figure 3.3: Neutral vs. loaded instructions wording. For each branch, the upper line
provides the neutral labels of the B treatment (bolded); below are the loaded labels of the
C treatment.
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3.3 Implementation
The experiment was conducted in November and December 2006 at CERGE-
EI in Prague, using a mobile experimental laboratory.15
Participants were recruited from the Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles
University in Prague, from various faculties of the Czech Technical University
in Prague and of the University of Economics in Prague. Students were
approached via posters distributed on campus and via e-mail.16
Treatment Subject
Source17
M/F
ratio18
mean
(age)
mean
(RA score)
mean
(final pay)
Irreg19
B FSS 8/4 20.9 29.7 320 1
B FSS 10/2 21.75 28.8 330 0
B CTU 11/1 22.9 34.7 330 0
B FSS 9/3 22.3 26.4 323.3 0
C CTU 9/3 21.9 33.7 340 0
C UE 7/5 22.9 28 318.3 1
C CTU 10/2 23 31.4 318.3 0
C UE 7/5 21.7 28.1 315 0
Table 3.2: Summary of the demographic characteristics of subjects for all eight sessions.
We conducted four sessions of each treatment. Twelve participants, six in
the role of Participant X – the entrepreneur – and six in the role of Participant
Y – the bureaucrat – interacted in each session. In each session, all subjects
participated in six rounds during which they kept the role that was assigned
to them at the beginning of the first round.20 Participants were anonymously
15http://home.cerge-ei.cz/ortmann/BA-PEL.htm
16By e-mail, we also directly invited students from these schools who participated earlier
in unrelated experiments conducted at CERGE-EI.
17For each session, subjects were recruited from one source. FSS stands for the Faculty
of Social Sciences in Prague, CTU for the Czech Technical University in Prague, UE for
the University of Economics in Prague. We control for imbalance of the subject pool by
including the econ and gender dummies in the econometric analysis.
18Male/Female ratio in the session.
19Irreg stands for a dummy variable for session irregularities. It identifies any unusual
activities by subjects or any irregularities on the experimenter’s side. In the first B treat-
ment session an experimenter effect is possible; in the second C treatment session, one
of the subjects reports “building engineering” as a field of study in a demographics ques-
tionnaire, which may mean that a CTU student participated in a UE session. We do not
believe that these irregularities matter but wanted to control nonetheless. After running
the preliminary regressions we concluded that they indeed did not matter.
20After each Participant X interacted exactly once with each Participant Y, the roles
were switched for another six rounds. Subjects were not informed about the switch of
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re-matched so that no subject was matched twice with the same co-player.
This was common knowledge. The incentive compatibility of this matching
scheme is discussed in Kamecke (1997).
Table 3.2 summarizes the demographic characteristics of subjects partici-
pating in the experiment. The majority of our subjects were male, reflecting
the composition of the subject pools that we drew on. Mean age ranged be-
tween 20.9 and 23, over all sessions the minimum is 18 and the maximum is
29. We also measured subjects’ risk aversion using a questionnaire based on
Holt and Laury (2002). Mean RA score in the sample ranged between 26.4
and 34.7, over all sessions the minimum is 13 and maximum 51.21 Average
final payoffs for the B treatment ranged from 320 to 330, with the minimum
being 300 and the maximum 400; for the C treatment it ranged between 315
and 340, with the minimum being 300 and the maximum 400.22
Each session began with general instructions. Afterwards, subjects were
asked to fill in Risk-aversion and Demographics questionnaires, for which
they earned their show-up fee. Then the instructions to the computerized
part of the experiment were distributed. Understanding of the instructions
was tested by a brief questionnaire. The computerized part of the experiment
started only after every participant answered all testing questions correctly.23
Each session concluded with a questionnaire asking for the subject’s feedback
on the experiment.24
roles in advance in order to avoid a possible impact on their behavior in the first six
rounds. Before the beginning of the seventh round the announcement about the switch
of roles appeared on their screens. The decisions in the last six rounds are likely affected
by subjects’ experience from the first six rounds and therefore we do not report them in
the main text. A comparison of the before-switch and after-switch data is provided in the
appendix. For both treatments, we observe more transferring in the after-switch data. In
the B treatment, we also observe more denouncing in both the second and the third stage.
In the C treatment, the differences for the second- and the third-stage data are very small.
21The higher the score, the more risk averse the subject is. The maximum possible
RA score is 60 which, using the standard CRRA utility function x(1−r), approximately
corresponds to a relative risk aversion coefficient of .17. The minimum possible RA score
is 0, which approximately corresponds to a relative risk aversion coefficient of −.13. An
RA score of 23 corresponds to risk-neutrality.
22At that point 400 CZK corresponded to about 16 USD, in purchasing power up to
twice as much. Subjects were informed during recruitment that their final payoff from
the experiment might be zero, but could not be negative. The non-negativity of the final
payoff was ensured by the show-up fee.
23This was common knowledge.
24For filling this last questionnaire, subjects were paid an additional 50-200 CZK (cor-
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All instructions were read aloud by the experimenter. As a part of the
instructions, subjects received a pictorial representation of the game with
a minimum use of game-theoretic terminology. Probabilistic outcomes were
presented in both probabilistic terms and frequency representation (see e.g.
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 1995, or Hertwig and Ortmann 2004).25
The experiment was computerized using Z-tree software (Fischbacher
2007). At the beginning of each round, each participant was notified of
her/his role. Participants X also learned their current per-round endow-
ment. Afterwards, each pair interacted sequentially.26 Between the second
and the third stage, Participants X were asked about their choices at each
node of the third stage if they were to reach it. After they made their con-
ditional choices, they learned the actual decision of their co-player and they
were asked to confirm, or to change, their previous choice. This mechanism
allowed us to collect some additional data in rounds when the third stage
was not reached.
At the end of each round subjects were given feedback about their ac-
tion(s), the action(s) of the player they were paired with, the realization of
the random outcome (detection vs. no detection, or outcome A vs. out-
come B) and their resulting payoff. At the end, one round was randomly
chosen to determine the final payoff from the computerized part of the ex-
periment. This mechanism was chosen in order to ensure that the decision in
every round is made as if in a one-shot game. This payment procedure was
common knowledge ex-ante.
Participants were paid anonymously in cash right after each session. We
used the Czech crown as the currency unit throughout the whole experiment.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Summary Data
In Figure 3.4, the results from low- and high-endowment periods are pre-
sented. Each figure integrates the results from both treatments – the B
responded to about 2-9 USD) - the amount varied between sessions. This mechanism was
used to adjust average earnings per session to the levels promised during recruitment.
25Originals (in Czech) of all materials that subjects received during the experiment are
available at http://home.cerge-ei.cz/richmanova/WorkInProgress.html.
26Choices were made by clicking the respective buttons on the screen. Subjects were
notified that once they made their choice it would not be possible to take it back.
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treatment data in the upper rows and C treatment data below. The equilib-
rium choices for each case are in bold face.
Figure 3.4: Experimental results. For each branch of the extensive form of the game,
the upper row always displays the frequency of the action in the B treatment, while the
lower row displays the frequency of the action in the C treatment (with the corresponding
percentage in parentheses). For stages E1 and E2, above the branches, we present the
conditional choices subjects were asked to report before they made their actual choice.
The frequencies of real choices, which depend on the preceding decision of Participant Y,
are presented at the bottom part of each figure.
For the aggregate first-stage data we observe surprisingly small differences
between the two treatments. In addition, in both treatments, the frequencies
of choosing Pay are higher in the low-endowment periods than in the high-
endowment periods, which contradicts the theoretical prediction. Intuitively,
subjects seem to be willing to transfer their (low) endowment to have a chance
of receiving a high payoff, but their willingness to risk their endowment is
limited. Instead of risking the high endowment, they seem to prefer the sure
outcome.
As to the second-stage data, it is only relative percentages that can
be compared across treatments, as the numbers of subjects that entered
this stage of the game varied. In the B treatment, subjects split their
choices evenly between playing Denounce or Action a for both low- and
high-endowment periods. The difference in expected payoffs resulting from
Denounce and Action a is, however, very small and might explain why we
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do not observe a stronger inclination to either choice. Also note that in both
treatments Denounce is the only action through which the bureaucrat can
avoid a negative expected round-payoff with certainty.27
In the C treatment, choices are shifted in favor of Denounce. Arguably,
in the high-endowment periods, this result contradicts the theoretical pre-
diction, but it is in line with our conjecture – knowing the context of their
action choice, reporting corruption might be more attractive for subjects.
In line with the theoretical prediction and also our intuition, Nothing28
was almost never chosen.
As to the third-stage data, conditional choices provide mixed evidence.
In both treatments, subjects seem to prefer playing Nothing in either case.
For the E1 node that contradicts the theoretical prediction, while it is in
line with the theoretical prediction for the E2 node. When we look at the
sequential choices, the results seem in line with the theoretical prediction
for both treatments, inferring from relatively few observations.29 We observe
essentially no framing effect for high-endowment periods. For low-endowment
periods, we observe a small shift in favor of Denounce, which is in line with
our expectations.
Note that for the second- and the third-stage data we have too few in-
dependent observations (especially so for the high-endowment periods)30 to
perform a reliable formal analysis. Therefore, we only perform statistical and
regression analyses of the first-stage data.
27See Figure 3.2 and Table 3.1 for more details. Even though the subject could possibly
earn a negative round payoff, each subject also received a show-up fee which ensured a
non-negative final payoff.
28Payoffs for Participant Y resulting from Nothing and Action a are the same, but taking
into account the likely decisions of Participant X in the following stage, he is more likely
to collect a higher payoff after choosing Action a.
29When we asked the subjects to make their real choices in the B treatment, only one of
them changed her/his decision in the E2 node from Denounce to Nothing (after observing
what Participant Y has chosen) in the low-endowment period. In the C treatment, three
subjects changed her/his decision in the E2 node – two switched from Nothing to Denounce
after Participant Y played Action a and one from Denounce to Nothing after Participant Y
played Action a – and one subject changed her/his decision in the E1 node from Nothing to
Denounce after Participant Y played Nothing. All four cases occurred in low-endowment
periods.
30Recall that Figure 3.4 presents the aggregated data from all relevant periods, therefore
it contains repeated observations for individual subjects.
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3.4.2 Analysis of the First-Stage Data
We performed standard non-parametric tests with the null hypothesis of no
differences in the distributions of choices under the two treatments. We also
computed the effect sizes to measure the magnitude of the treatment effect.
Finally, we report the results from the estimation of a linear probability
model in which we control for some demographic characteristics of subjects.
Due to the panel nature of the data, we considered four different ap-
proaches to formal regression analysis: 1) clustered data analysis – data
from periods 1, 3, and 5 (low-endowment) and from periods 2, 4, and 6 (high-
endowment) are clustered by subject to correct standard errors for likely
within-subject correlation; 2) first-period data analysis – only first-period
data (for the low-endowment case) and only second-period data (for the
high-endowment case) are analyzed; 3) averaged data analysis – averaged
data for periods 1, 3, and 5 and for periods 2, 4, and 6 are analyzed; and 4)
dominant-choice data analysis – for each endowment value (low or high) each
subject makes choices in three periods, and the dominant choice is the one
that is played more often.
Clustered data have the advantage of using all the available information,
while the other three approaches use only a part of the information we have.
Therefore, in the main text we discuss the results for clustered data. The
analysis of averaged, first-period, and dominant-choice data can be found in
the appendix, as a robustness check of the main results. By and large, there
are no major findings in these robustness tests.
In addition to the robustness checks based on different“data handling”, we
also run a few exploratory sessions of treatments in which the experimental
conditions are only slightly modified compared to the benchmark and the
context treatment. The results from the analysis on the extended data set
is provided in the appendix, as an additional robustness check of the main
results. By and large, there are no major findings in these robustness checks.
Pooling slightly different treatments leads to noisier results, which is not very
surprising.
Statistical Analysis
In Table 3.3 we report the results of three standard non-parametric tests in
order to identify the differences in the distributions of choices under the two
treatments. Specifically, we test the null hypothesis of no differences between
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the two treatments using the averages of the binary transfer variable31 over
periods 1, 3, and 5 and 2, 4, and 6.
periods Ranksum32 Ksmirnov33 Fisher34
1,3,5 -.526
(.599)
.083
(.846)
(.947)
2,4,6 -.715
(.475)
.167
(.513)
(.218)
Table 3.3: Non-parametric tests.
According to Wilcoxon rank-sum, Kolmogorov-Smirnov, and Fisher’s ex-
act tests, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no differences in the distributions
of choices under the two treatments at the 5% significance level.
To assess the magnitude of the effect for practical purposes, we in addition
compute two standardized measures of effect size: Cohen’s d and odds ratio,
again, using the averages of the binary transfer variable over periods 1, 3,
and 5 and 2, 4, and 6. We also want to look separately at male and female
data to discover possible gender effects. The results for the full sample and
for the male and female subsamples are reported in Table 3.4.
B C effect size
Periods Sample N mean std.dev. N mean std.dev. odds ratio Cohen’s d
1,3,5 full 24 .528 .4495 24 .597 .4282 1.131 .1571
male 18 .519 .4461 17 .667 .4082 1.285 .346
female 6 .556 .5018 7 .429 .4600 .772 -.264
2,4,6 full 24 .222 .3764 24 .25 .3147 1.126 .0807
male 18 .296 .4105 17 .275 .3170 .929 -.057
female 6 0 0 7 .190 .3253 NA35 .826
Table 3.4: Effect-size indices.
Cohen (1998) defines effect sizes of d = 0.2 as small, d = 0.5 as medium,
and d = 0.8 as large. For the full sample, the results suggest only a small
effect. However, when we look at the male and female subsamples separately,
the effect size appears larger than in the full sample. It is also noticeable
31Transfer has a value of one if Participant X chooses Pay and a value of zero if s/he
chooses Not Pay in the respective period.
32Ranksum stands for the two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (or Mann-Whitney) test. We
report the normalized z statistic and corresponding p-value below.
33Ksmirnov stands for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. We report the statistic and below
the corresponding p-value from testing the hypothesis that average transfer is lower in the
B treatment.
34Fisher stands for Fisher’s exact test. We report the resulting p-value.
35A division-by-zero problem occurs, due to no variation in this subsample.
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that the effects for the male and for the female subsamples have opposite
directions, which naturally results in a very small total effect. We observe
very similar results when looking at the odds ratio – the effect is smaller in
the full sample than in the two subsamples. These results suggest a non-
negligible gender effect.
Altogether, both statistical tests and effect-size measures suggest that
there are only minor differences between the first-stage choices in the C and
B treatments. Effect-size measures for the male and female subsamples sug-
gest that this result might be caused by counteracting gender effects. There-
fore, further analysis which would control for gender and for other subjects’
characteristics is called for.
Gender Differences
Before the estimation, we want to look more closely into the gender-specific
data. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 provide the summary data separately for men and
women.
For low-endowment periods, in the first stage of the B treatment the
difference in the behavior of men and of women does not appear substantial
– slightly more than half of each makes the transfer. However, in the C
treatment, the transferring decisions of males and of females shift in opposite
directions – two thirds of men, whereas less than a half of women, decide to
make the transfer. This suggests that the corruption framing affects men
and women differently.
Similarly in the second stage we can clearly see from the descriptive data
that facing a full context, women become much more likely to report. Men’s
decisions seem to remain unaffected.
The results from the last stage are not so clearly distributed. In the E1
node we observe the opposite effect of context on men than on women. In
the E2 node, the direction of the effect does not vary with gender. In general,
both men and women prefer doing Nothing to Denouncing.
In the first stage of the high-endowment periods, the results are somewhat
different. We still observe considerably more women refraining from making
transfers but the framing effect seems to increase the transfer rate. Recall,
however, that the results from the regression analysis suggest that these four
observations might be just random realization. We observe almost no framing
effect in the male subsample. In general, both men and women prefer not
making the transfer.
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Figure 3.5: Experimental results for male and for female subjects in low-endowment pe-
riods. For each branch of the extensive form of the game, the upper row always displays
the frequency of the action in the B treatment, while the lower row displays the frequency
of the action in the C treatment (with the corresponding percentage in parentheses). For
the nodes E1 and E2, above the branches, we present the conditional choices subjects
were asked to report before they made their actual choice. The frequencies of real choices,
which depend on the preceding decision of Participant Y, are presented at the bottom part
of each figure.
In the second stage, the female subsample in the role of Participant Y
is very small. In both treatments, all the women choose Denounce. For the
male subsample, we observe some (possible) treatment effect, which shifts
the choices more in favor of playing Denounce in the C treatment.
In the third stage the percentage of men choosing Denounce slightly de-
creases with framing, while for females it goes slightly up. In both subsam-
ples, the prevailing choice is doing Nothing, though.
Econometric Analysis
In this section we report the results from econometric analysis controlling
for some of the subjects’ characteristics and for the treatment effect. We are
also trying to confirm gender-specific effects.
During the experiment we distributed questionnaires in order to collect
basic demographic data. Specifically, we have information about subjects’
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Figure 3.6: Experimental results for male and for female subjects in high-endowment
periods. For each branch of the extensive form of the game, the upper row always displays
the frequency of the action in the B treatment, while the lower row displays the frequency
of the action in the C treatment (with the corresponding percentage in parentheses). For
the nodes E1 and E2, above the branches, we present the conditional choices subjects were
asked to report before they made their actual choice. Frequencies of real choices, which
depend on the preceding decision of Participant Y, are presented at the bottom part of
each figure.
age, gender, university and field of study.36 We also measure each subject’s
risk aversion.
The dependent variable was defined as a 0/1 dummy variable translog
identifying Pay being chosen (value of 1) or not (value of 0) in a particular
period. We estimate a clustered linear probability model. We prefer a linear
36In addition, we collected data on: size of subject’s household, number of cars in the
household, and whether the subject himself has his own car and what is its approximate
value, all of which serve as proxies for income. We also asked the subjects whether they
considered themselves as technical types compared to their peers. We recorded the oc-
currence of any inconsistencies in the after-instructions questionnaire, which served as a
simple test of understanding of the basic structure of the game, and in the risk-aversion
questionnaire. At the end of the session we asked our subjects whether they understood
the experiment. Finally, we recorded some general information about each session – the
time of day it started and any session irregularities if they occurred. After running some
preliminary regressions we, however, conclude that none of these variables is significant
for explaining subjects’ decisions. The demographic and the risk-aversion questionnaires
are based on Rydval (2007).
CHAPTER 3. NATURAL FRAMING 97
probability model to other non-linear alternatives, as it does not rely on very
specific distributional assumptions, the violation of which leads to inconsis-
tent estimates if non-linear models are employed. Another advantage of the
linear probability model lies in the straightforward interpretation of the es-
timated coefficients. We ran clustered robust estimation to correct standard
errors for likely within-subject correlation and for heteroskedasticity.
In the appendix, we provide a discussion of the robustness checks we
conducted in addition to the clustered regressions analysis. As the theoretical
prediction differs for low- and for high-endowment periods,37 these two groups
were analyzed separately.
We start with a basic minimal model:38
P (translog = 1|x) = β0 + β1 · age+ β2 ·male+ β3 · econ+ β4 · Ctreat,
where age corresponds to subject’s reported age, male is a dummy vari-
able defined based on subject’s reported gender, and econ is a dummy vari-
able identifying a subject having (value of 1) or not having (value of 0) an
economic background, which is defined based on the subject’s reported field
of study. As we are mainly interested in the treatment effect, we also include
a C-treatment dummy Ctreat in the model.
The results from the estimation are summarized in Table 3.5, denoted
as Model 1. This model is, however, not significant. In the next step, we
extend the basic minimal model by interaction terms with male to allow for
gender-specific effects. This leads to Model 2:
P (translog = 1|x) = β0 + β1 · age+ β2 ·male+ β3 · econ+ β4 · Ctreat+
+β5 ·male ∗ age+ β6 ·male ∗ econ+ β7 ·male ∗ Ctreat.
37Recall that in periods 1, 3, and 5 the endowment was low, while in periods 2, 4, and 6
the endowment was high.
38The second approach we used was P (translog = 1|x) = β0 + β1 · ra score, where
ra score is a risk aversion score computed based on data from the risk-aversion question-
naire. Preliminary analysis suggests that age, male and econ predict ra score well (all three
are jointly significant at the 5% level, age and male with a negative sign on the coefficient,
age with a positive; our proxy for income appeared insignificant, which is reasonable given
our population sample). It was natural to consider these two sets of independent variables
- one including ra score only, and the other including male, age and income - as candidates
for minimal models for our analysis. However, in P (translog = 1|x) = β0 + β1 · ra score
ra score never appeared significant and only rarely we observed the joint significance of
the estimated models. Therefore, we omit a discussion of these results.
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The results from the estimation of Model 2 are also summarized in Table
3.5.
periods 1,3,5 periods 2,4,6
Model 1 2 1 2
age -.0287
(.302)
.1280
(.007)
.0220
(.381)
.0913
(.000)
male .0686
(.646)
3.3442
(.010)
.1706
(.055)
2.5462
(.014)
econ -.1601
(.212)
-.6307
(.000)
-.0731
(.503)
.2210
(.001)
Ctreat .0559
(.657)
-.7156
(.004)
.0230
(.809)
-.0375
(.644)
age∗ male - -.1852
(.002)
- -.0941
(.032)
econ∗ male - .5354
(.002)
- -.3395
(.019)
Ctreat∗ male - .7983
(.006)
- .0036
(.983)
const 1.2342
(.068)
-1.4593
(.139)
-.3400
(.553)
-2.1070
(.000)
mean bp(y=1) .5625 .5625 .2361 .2361
# of obs. 144 144 144 144
joint p-value (.488) (.000) (.078) (.000)
Table 3.5: Results from estimation of the linear probability model(s). The first row of
each cell reports estimated coefficients. The second row reports the corresponding p-value.
Mean p̂(y=1) denotes the mean predicted probability of a transfer being made.
Model 2 is strongly significant and this confirms a strong gender effect.
Therefore, in the discussion that follows, we will concentrate on the results
from Model 2.
For both low- and high-endowment-period data, the joint p-value of the
model is .000. All demographic characteristics – age, male, and econ – and
their interaction terms are significant at the 5% level. Interestingly, the
treatment dummy together with its interaction term is only significant for
the low-endowment periods. This suggests that only for the low-endowment
periods the presentation of the game matters.
The mean predicted probability of transfer in the low-endowment periods
is .56; in the high-endowment periods it is only .24, which is considerably
lower. This result contradicts the theoretical prediction.39
For the low-endowment periods, age has a positive sign on the coefficient
for female, but a negative sign for male. Econ has a negative sign on the
39Recall that in the equilibrium Participant X always transfers high endowment and
never transfers low.
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coefficient for both male and female. The intercept is negative for women
and positive for men. This means that with the same characteristics, women
are less likely to make the transfer than men.
Treatment dummy Ctreat has a negative sign for female but positive for
male subjects. This suggests a negative impact of a corruption context on
the transferring decision for women but a positive impact for men, which is
an intriguing result.
For the high-endowment periods, both age and econ have a positive
sign on the coefficient for female, but negative for male. Similarly to low-
endowment periods, the intercept is negative for women and positive for
men. Thus, also when the endowment is high, having the same characteris-
tics, women are less likely to make the transfer than men.
The treatment dummy Ctreat has a negative sign for both female and
male subjects, which is yet another difference from low-endowment periods.
This suggests a negative impact of a corruption context on the transferring
decision – in high-endowment periods subjects are less likely to transfer when
they are fully aware of the context. Note, however, that even though the sign
reflects the expected impact of context, the coefficient is not significant.
3.5 Discussion
Some of the results confirm our expectations whereas some do not.
In the aggregate data, we find only a small and statistically insignificant
treatment effect, which is in line with Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006) but
not with our expectations. Once we look at the male and female subsamples
separately, we discover (significant) gender effects that cancel each other out
and are responsible for the reduced overall effect of non-neutral framing.
For the aggregate second-stage data, the treatment effect shows in an
increased denouncing rate, which is in line with our expectations. For male
and female subsamples, as much as we can tell given the low number of ob-
servations, denouncing rates are lower or the same40 in the B treatment. Also
for the aggregate third-stage data the treatment effect goes in the predicted
direction.
Different attitudes of men and of women towards corruption have previ-
ously been reported by, for example, Alatas et al. (2006). These authors
40This refers to all possible cases, when we are looking separately at male and female
subsamples for high- and for low-endowment periods.
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find significant differences in the behavior of men and women in a corruption
experiment. Their results, however, appear to be culture-specific.41
The observed negative impact of non-neutral framing on the transferring
decisions of women, together with the positive impact on the denouncing
decisions of women, are in line with earlier findings of women being less
likely to engage in, as well as less tolerant of (thus more likely to act against),
corruption than men (e.g., Swamy, Knack, Lee and Azfar, 2001, or Dollar,
Fisman and Gatti, 2001).
For low-endowment periods, we find a positive impact of a bribery context
on the transfer rates of men. This suggests the opposite treatment effect
to what we expected, but only for the male subsample. Women react to
the context by reduced transferring. The (significant) result for the male
subsample is very surprising and difficult to understand.
For high-endowment periods, the treatment effect appears insignificant.
We find a (slightly) reduced transfer rate for male and a (slightly) increased
transfer rate for the female subsample. The result for the female subsample
is counterintuitive, however, the results of the t-test suggest that it might be
due to random realization.
Another interesting result is that for both low- and high-endowment pe-
riods more than 50% of subjects do not play the equilibrium. Recall that
theoretically, the optimal strategies are to transfer when the endowment is
high and not to transfer when the endowment is low. For both treatments we
observe just the opposite – relatively high transfer rates for low-endowment
periods and relatively low transfer rates for high-endowment periods.
This phenomenon, in addition, appears robust. In Krajcˇova´ (2008) the
same result is found for the high-incentive treatment.42
There are several possible explanations. One of them is the “preference
for inclusion” conjectured by Cooper and Van Huyck (2003). They find that
subjects are significantly more likely to make“non-rational”choices that allow
their co-player to make a choice – and thereby to affect the final payoffs –
when given extensive form versions of a game. In our game, “inclusion”
introduces the risk of a significant loss. Our results suggest that subjects
with a “preference for inclusion” were willing to transfer and to continue
playing the game as long as the stakes were not too high (low endowment).
41The authors run the experiment in Melbourne (Australia), Delhi (India), Jakarta
(Indonesia), and Singapore. Only the Australian data confirm a significant gender effect.
42Recall that the benchmark treatment is the same for both Chapters 2 and 3.
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We also note that the theoretical prediction is computed under the as-
sumption of risk neutrality, which, as also suggested by the data from the
risk-aversion questionnaire, is not likely to hold in our sample. When we
computed the theoretical prediction for a (modestly) risk averse subject, we
found that under some (reasonable) assumptions, our chosen parameteriza-
tion can lead to a no-corruption equilibrium also for the high-endowment
periods.43 That is, for risk-averse subjects, it might be in fact optimal not
to transfer a high endowment.
Finally, the nature of the game implies that the endowment has explicit
payoff consequences in the second and the third stage of the game only for
Participant Y, not for Participant X. Therefore, the strategic importance of
the endowment level might have been less obvious to Participants X than we
thought.
Our results suggest that context indeed plays an important role for a sub-
ject’s behavior in a bribery game. Importantly, the effect on male participants
might be different than the effect on female participants. Some of our results
are not significant, but this might be caused by the relatively small sam-
ple and the gender-unbalanced subject pool. With more subjects, possibly
observed over more periods, and with a better gender-balanced sample, our
results might become more conclusive.44 Altogether, we conclude that sub-
jects seem to engage in all sorts of social considerations in a bribery game,
including moral scruples, which should not be dismissed by experimenters
looking for relevant policy implications.
43We assume the standard CRRA utility function u(x) = x(1−r). The average risk-
aversion coefficient in our sample is about 0.03, and the maximal is about 0.1. As the
bribery game involves nodes with negative payoffs, some assumptions need to be made
about the utility function in the negative domain. The prospect theory suggests that in
the negative domain, the steepness of the utility function might be about twice as much
as in the positive domain. For illustration, we computed the theoretical prediction for a
risk-neutral subject assuming two different levels of (dis)utility from paying a 300 CZK
penalty after detection: u(−300) = −u(450) and u(−300) = −u(600). For low endowment,
the theoretical prediction is the same as for a risk-neutral subject. For high endowment
it changes. For an extremely risk-averse participant (r = 0.1), the disutility of 450 still
predicts a corruption equilibrium, however, the disutility of 600 predicts a no-corruption
equilibrium. For an average risk-aversion coefficient (r = 0.03), the disutility of 450 is
sufficient to change the theoretical prediction.
44Ortmann and Tichy (1999) also report some evidence of differences in the (cooperative)
behavior of men and women. Also the gender composition of the subject pool in the
experimental session matters. When controlling for past experience, gender differences,
however, disappear.
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APPENDIX
Comparing Data from Periods Before and After the Switching of
Roles.
In Figure 3.7, we present the data from the before- and after-the-switch-
of-roles periods for low and high endowments of the B treatment.
Figure 3.7: Before- vs. after-the-switch-of-roles data in the B treatment. Before-switch
data are in the upper rows and after-switch data are below.
In both cases, we observe a somewhat higher transfer rate in the second
six periods. Similarly as in the first part of the experiment, the transfer rate
is higher in periods when the endowment is low than when it is high. In the
B0 node, more subjects chose the safe option (with no possibility of loss) after
the switch of roles. This means for low-endowment periods a shift towards,
but for high-endowment periods a shift further away from, the theoretical
prediction. In the E2 node, results from before- and after-switch data are
very similar and for both low and high endowment, and they are in line with
the theoretical prediction. In the E1 node, we observe a shift towards the
equilibrium after the switch of roles.
In Figure 3.8, we present the data from before- and after-the-switch-of-
roles periods from the low- and high-endowment periods of the C treatment.
In the C treatment, the transfer rate drops after the switch of roles, more
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so in periods when the endowment is high. This is just the opposite effect
as in the B treatment. The transfer rate is higher when the endowment is
low in both cases, before and after the switch of roles, which contradicts the
theoretical prediction. In the B0 node, a higher fraction of subjects chose the
safe option (with no possibility of loss) after the switch of roles. This is a
similar result as in the B treatment – for low-endowment periods it means a
shift towards, but for high-endowment periods a shift further away from, the
theoretical prediction. In the E1 and E2 nodes, the results from before- and
after-switch data are similar for low-endowment periods (more so in the E1
than in the E2 node). In high endowment periods we observe no difference
at all.
Figure 3.8: Before- vs. after-the-switch-of-roles data in the C treatment. Before-switch
data are in the upper rows and after-switch data are below.
Robustness Checks
We performed two types of robustness check of our estimation results.
The first regards the way we treated individual observations over rounds
when running regressions – this is discussed in the subsection Handling of the
Data. The second regards the experimental design – we run several sessions
of alternative treatments in which we introduce only minor changes that do
not appear to significantly affect behavior of subjects – this is discussed in
the subsection Pooling the Sessions.
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A. Handling of the Data
Throughout the analysis we have defined three alternative dependent vari-
ables, each of which captures slightly different information about the first-
stage data. Translog is a 0/1 dummy variable identifying transfer being made
(value of 1) or not (value of 0) in a particular period. Atranslog is the average
value of translog for one individual over periods 1, 3, and 5 ( low-endowment
periods) or 2, 4, and 6 (high-endowment periods). Ltranslog defines the dom-
inant choice of a subject in periods 1, 3, and 5 or 2, 4, and 6. For a subject
who has chosen Pay two or three times out of a total three periods of interest,
the dominant choice is 1; for a subject who has chosen Not Pay two or three
times out of total three periods of interest, the dominant choice is 0.
Then, using one of the three types of dependent variable, we conducted
four different types of regression analysis.
Clustered Regressions – as discussed in the main text, we run a clus-
tered (robust)45 linear probability model estimation with the binary variable
translog as a dependent variable.
Regressions on Averaged Data – in this case, we run an ordinary least
squares estimation of atranslog. We analyze only averaged data, where higher
values of atranslog correspond to more transfers being made and thus to a
stronger preference for this choice.46
Regressions on the 1st or 2nd Period Data – we estimate LPM only on
the 1st and 2nd period translog (for low- and high-endowment periods, respec-
tively). In this approach we are omitting part of the information, however
we only use the part of the data that is not affected by the experience from
previous rounds.47
Regressions on Dominant Choice – we estimate LPM using ltranslog as a
dependent variable. Thus in this case, we are only looking at the dominant
choice of each subject.
First we look at effect size measures, whether they give robust results for
all four approaches to the data. The results are summarized in Table 3.6.
In all cases, the effects are small (recall that Cohen 1998 defines effect
sizes of d = 0.2 as small), for high-endowment dominant choice data the
45Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and for within-subject correlation.
46We also run poisson regressions on a count variable (counting the number of transfers
made by an individual in the relevant three periods). The qualitative results are the same
as with OLS and atranslog.
47We realize that for 2nd period data this may not be completely true if subjects fail to
realize that it is a different game they are playing in the high-endowment periods.
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B C effect size
Data mean std.dev. mean std.dev. odds ratio Cohen’s d
1,3,5 1st period .583 .5036 .625 .4945 1.072 .0841
average .528 .4495 .597 .4282 1.131 .1571
dominant .5 .5108 .583 .5036 1.166 .1635
all periods .528 .5027 .597 .4939 1.131 .1385
2,4,6 2nd period .292 .4643 .25 .4423 0.856 -.0926
average .222 .3764 .25 .3147 1.126 .0807
dominant .25 .4423 .25 .4423 1 0
all periods .222 .4187 .25 .4361 1.126 .0655
Table 3.6: Effect-size indices.
effect is zero (but we need to keep in mind that only part of the available
information is used). Except for 2nd period data, also the direction of effect is
the same in all cases. This suggests that initially, the transfer rate was lower
for high-endowment periods in the context treatment but in later periods it
increased. When we look at the male and female subsamples, the results are
also robust for all four approaches – suggesting a counteracting gender effect
(we omit reporting all numbers here as they are very similar to the results
for averaged data reported in Table 3.4 in the main text).
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 summarize the main results from the estimation for low-
and high-endowment periods. For all four approaches, the models that do not
allow for gender-specific effects are not significant. Therefore in the discussion
that follows we will concentrate only on models containing interaction terms.
For the low-endowment periods, the results from the averaged, 1st period
and dominant-choice data analysis confirm the results from the clustered
regressions. We find the directions of all the effects the same, the explanatory
variables are significant in most cases and there are no dramatic differences in
coefficient sizes. Only econ and econ*male are not significant in the 1st period
data case. They both become significant once we include the information
from later rounds – for clustered, averaged and dominant-choice data.
For the high-endowment periods, only the results from averaged and
dominant-choice data analysis confirm the results from clustered regressions
– the treatment dummy is not significant, neither is its interaction term, the
directions of all the effects are the same, and the sizes of the coefficients are
comparable. For the 2nd period data the estimated model is not significant.
This suggests that the behavior in the second period is different, and more
difficult to explain by demographic characteristics. To be able to say whether
in later rounds the behavior really stabilizes, we would need to observe more
high-endowment periods.
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Periods 1,3,5
clustered averaged 1st period dominant
age -.0287
(.302)
.1280
(.007)
-.0287
(.317)
.1280
(.011)
-.0069
(.822)
.1255
(.034)
-.0470
(.160)
.1141
(.058)
male .0686
(.646)
3.3442
(.010)
.0686
(.656)
3.3442
(.015)
.2748
(.117)
2.8556
(.067)
.0758
(.664)
3.4441
(.042)
econ -.1601
(.212)
-.6307
(.000)
-.1601
(.226)
-.6307
(.000)
-.1269
(.416)
-.3627
(.313)
-.1529
(.342)
-.8570
(.000)
Ctreat .0559
(.657)
-.7156
(.004)
.0559
(.666)
-.7156
(.006)
.0381
(.794)
-.7183
(.007)
.0733
(.621)
-.6802
(.010)
age*male - -.1852
(.002)
- -.1852
(.003)
- -.1446
(.035)
- -.1983
(.009)
econ*male - .5354
(.002)
- .5354
(.004)
- .2467
(.534)
- .8200
(.000)
Ctreat*male - .7983
(.006)
- .7983
(.010)
- .8433
(.009)
- .7390
(.025)
const 1.2342
(.068)
-1.4593
(.139)
1.2342
(.077)
-1.4593
(.162)
.6265
(.382)
-1.7304
(.194)
1.6046
(.047)
-1.0004
(.444)
mean bp(y=1) .5625 .5625 .5625 .5625 .6042 .6042 .5417 .5417
# of obs. 144 144 48 48 48 48 48 48
joint p-value .488 .000 .519 .000 .370 .001 .370 .000
Table 3.7: Results from clustered regressions vs. regressions on averaged, 1st period, and
dominant-choice data from low-endowment periods.
B. Pooling the Sessions
In addition to the benchmark treatment B we conducted two plus two
sessions of “automatic” treatments A and AI. Under both treatments, A and
AI, we used the same game and same parameterization as in the B treatment.
The only difference was that in automatic treatments, each subject played
against a computer program, with six subjects in the role of Participant X
and six subjects in the role of Participant Y. The computer program always
played a (subgame perfect) optimal strategy. Subjects were acquainted with
these facts in the instructions.
The only difference between A and AI treatments was that in AI subjects
received, as a separate part of the instructions, a so-called Backwards In-
duction Tutorial, intended to explain the basic principles of using backwards
induction.
In addition to the full-context C treatment, we conducted two sessions
with partial context – the C- treatment. In the C- treatment, the subjects
receive only limited information about the context – Participant X is called
“Entrepreneur” and Participant Y is called “Bureaucrat”. Actions are, how-
ever, denoted by neutral letters – the same as in the B treatment.
Before pooling the data from different treatments we performed basic
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Periods 2,4,6
clustered averaged 2nd period dominant
age .0220
(.381)
.0913
(.000)
.0220
(.396)
.0913
(.000)
.0052
(.873)
.0456
(.397)
.0486
(.108)
.1369
(.000)
male .1706
(.055)
2.5462
(.014)
.1706
(.063)
2.5462
(.021)
.2312
(.051)
2.0233
(.241)
.1133
(.327)
3.2569
(.010)
econ -.0731
(.503)
.2210
(.001)
-.0731
(.516)
.2210
(.002)
-.1495
(.334)
.1772
(.274)
-.1039
(.483)
.3316
(.002)
Ctreat .0230
(.809)
-.0375
(.644)
.0230
(.815)
-.0375
(.663)
-.0514
(.699)
.0480
(.627)
-.0143
(.908)
-.0563
(.663)
age*male - -.0941
(.032)
- -.0941
(.043)
- -.0625
(.397)
- -.1215
(.023)
econ*male - -.3395
(.019)
- -.3395
(.026)
- -.3710
(.133)
- -.5021
(.016)
Ctreat*male - .0036
(.983)
- .0036
(.984)
- -.1750
(.424)
- -.0395
(.863)
const -.3400
(.553)
-2.1070
(.000)
-.3400
(.565)
-2.1070
(.000)
.1145
(.875)
-1.1202
(.370)
-.8378
(.214)
-3.1605
(.000)
mean bp(y=1) .2361 .2361 .2361 .2361 .2708 .2708 .25 .25
# of obs. 144 144 48 48 48 48 48 48
joint p-value .078 .000 .095 .000 .175 .027 .183 .000
Table 3.8: Results from clustered regressions vs. regressions on averaged, 1st period, and
dominant-choice data from high-endowment periods.
statistical tests in order to discover significant differences in the distributions
of choices – Fisher’s exact test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. We find no
evidence of significant differences in the distributions of choices between A,
AI and B treatments, nor between C- and C treatments.
Afterwards, we performed two types of pooled analysis: 1) pooling the
data from A and B treatments vs. pooling the data from C- and C treatments;
and 2) pooling the data from A, AI and B treatments vs. pooling the data
from C- and C treatments. Note that in 1) both pools contain the same
number of subjects, which is not the case after we extend the benchmark-
type pool by data from AI.
See Tables 3.9 and 3.10 for the regression results for low- and high-
endowment periods, respectively. Clearly, pooling slightly different treat-
ments leads to noisier results, which is not very surprising.
For both low- and high-endowment periods, the significance of econ (and
its interaction term) disappears.
As regards the treatment dummy, on the one hand, the significance for
low-endowment periods disappears, but on the other hand, the treatment
dummy becomes significant for high-endowment-period data.
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Periods 1,3,5
B vs. C B,A vs. C,C- B,A,AI vs. C,C-
age -.0287
(.302)
.1280
(.007)
-.0191
(.380)
.0854
(.073)
-.0093
(.641)
.0784
(.040)
male .0686
(.646)
3.3442
(.010)
.0162
(.890)
2.4523
(.039)
.0076
(.940)
2.2189
(.030)
econ -.1601
(.212)
-.6307
(.000)
-.1754
(.089)
-.3061
(.025)
-.1343
(.164)
-.0944
(.532)
CCtreat .0559
(.657)
-.7156
(.004)
.0609
(.550)
-.2708
(.218)
.0736
(.449)
-.2738
(.178)
age*male - -.1852
(.002)
- -.1235
.(023)
- -.1080
(.018)
econ*male - .5354
(.002)
- .1801
(.318)
- .0005
(.998)
CCtreat*male - .7983
(.006)
- .3586
(.154)
- .3877
(.101)
const 1.2342
(.068)
-1.4593
(.139)
1.0848
(.035)
-.9740
(.339)
.8308
(.071)
-.9774
(.243)
mean p(y=1) .5625 .5625 .5787 .5787 .5714 .5714
# of obs. 144 144 216 216 252 252
joint p-value .488 .000 .439 .066 .675 .2194
Table 3.9: Results from estimation on basic vs. extended data sets for low-endowment
periods. CCtreat is a dummy identifying context-type treatment(s) – C, or C and C-
treatments.
Periods 2,4,6
B vs. C B,A vs. C,C- B,A,AI vs. C,C-
age .0220
(.381)
.0913
(.000)
.0310
(.100)
.1134
(.000)
.0253
(.160)
.0758
(.007)
male .1706
(.055)
2.5462
(.014)
.0620
(.461)
2.3301
(.001)
.0144
(.867)
1.4000
(.081)
econ -.0731
(.503)
.2210
(.001)
-.1751
(.070)
-.1029
(.616)
-.1424
(.113)
.0227
(.876)
CCtreat .0230
(.809)
-.0375
(.644)
-.0780
(.331)
-.2268
(.072)
-.1172
(.133)
-.2955
(.026)
age*male - -.0941
(.032)
- -.1019
(.001)
- -.0601
(.099)
econ*male - -.3395
(.019)
- -.0768
(.740)
- -.2101
(.248)
CCtreat*male - .0036
(.983)
- .1282
(.436)
- .1958
(.243)
const -.3900
(.553)
-2.1070
(.000)
-.3103
(.469)
-2.1335
(.000)
-.1354
(.737)
-1.2879
(.029)
mean p(y=1) .2361 .2361 .2593 .2593 .2817 .2817
# of obs. 144 144 216 216 252 252
joint p-value .078 .000 .045 .000 .075 .040
Table 3.10: Results from estimation on basic vs. extended data sets for high-endowment
periods. CCtreat is a dummy identifying context-type treatment(s) – C, or C and C-
treatments.
